What role did Customs and Border Protection play in fentanyl interdiction from 2021–2024?

Checked on January 7, 2026
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Executive summary

From 2021–2024 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) emerged as the federal frontline agency for intercepting fentanyl, reporting record seizures, launching targeted counter‑fentanyl operations, and coordinating intelligence and enforcement at ports of entry and along the southwest border [1] [2] [3]. Independent oversight, however, warns DHS lacks the clear performance goals and metrics needed to fully assess how CBP’s growing seizure numbers translate into long‑term disruption of supply chains [4] [1].

1. CBP as the principal interdiction force: seizure volumes and trends

CBP’s own statistics and DHS summaries show CBP and its Office of Field Operations accounted for the largest share of DHS fentanyl seizures in fiscal years 2021–2024, with agency reports citing tens of thousands of pounds seized and claims of record amounts—nearly 50,000 pounds over the last two fiscal years and more than 13,000 pounds seized in early FY2024—figures used repeatedly in CBP and DHS releases [4] [5] [3]. GAO analysis corroborates that DHS components, led by CBP and HSI, together reported seizures totaling almost 460,000 pounds of fentanyl and related chemicals and equipment across FY2021–2024, underscoring CBP’s central role in the overall federal interdiction tally [1].

2. New operations and shifting tactics: Apollo, Plaza Spike, Hourglass and Artemis

Beginning in late 2023 CBP formalized a counter‑fentanyl strategy and launched national and regional operations—Operation Apollo, Operation Plaza Spike, Operation Hourglass and Operation Artemis—designed to surge personnel, target pill presses and precursors, and concentrate interdiction at strategic ports of entry and plaza chokepoints north of cartel territories [2] [6] [7]. CBP credits these operations for contributing to the rise in seizures between 2023 and 2024, and describes their use of “jump teams,” surge deployments and coordinated multi‑agency tasking to disrupt production and transit nodes [4] [5].

3. Tools, partnerships and investigative support

CBP amplified technical and analytic tools—non‑intrusive inspection systems, canine teams, laboratory attribution efforts conducted jointly with FDA and DEA, and data pilots for small‑package shipments—while working alongside Homeland Security Investigations and foreign partners such as Mexico and Canada to trace precursors, pill presses and supply chains [2] [5] [8]. HSI’s targeting and “lookouts” in CBP systems are portrayed as complementary: HSI investigates transnational criminal organizations while CBP executes the bulk of inspections and seizures at entry nodes [4] [1].

4. Evidence of impact and the limits of measurement

Seizure spikes are clear—CBP reports dramatic year‑to‑year increases and high‑profile multi‑hundred‑to‑thousand pound interdictions—but GAO flags a key caveat: DHS has not established outcome‑oriented goals or consistent metrics to determine whether higher seizure volumes reflect sustained disruption of trafficking networks, displacement to other routes, or merely more effective detection [4] [1]. Independent analyses and CBP’s own data also show most interdictions occur at ports of entry, complicating political narratives that focus on migrant crossings as the principal vector [9] [10].

5. Messaging, political context and incentives

CBP’s repeated public updates, monthly releases and agency magazine pieces have emphasized record seizures and lethal‑dose equivalents, language that builds public urgency and supports requests for more resources and technology funding [11] [12] [13]. That messaging aligns with congressional pushes for increased budgets for personnel and inspection technology, and while it underscores operational successes it also raises questions—acknowledged by GAO—about whether publicized seizure counts are being used as a primary success metric rather than part of a validated strategy for long‑term disruption [4] [13].

6. Bottom line and open questions

Between 2021 and 2024 CBP substantially increased its role in fentanyl interdiction by executing targeted operations, expanding technologies and interagency collaboration, and contributing the bulk of DHS seizures at ports of entry; yet independent oversight cautions that without clearer goals and evaluation measures it is premature to conclude these actions meaningfully reduced domestic supply or deaths [1] [4] [2]. Reporting documents the “what”—seizures, operations, partnerships—but DHS and GAO sources leave unanswered the critical “how much” and “for how long,” which warrant continued public scrutiny and data‑driven assessment [4] [1].

Want to dive deeper?
How much of CBP’s fentanyl seizure volume from 2021–2024 came from ports of entry versus between‑ports crossings?
What specific performance metrics has GAO recommended DHS adopt to evaluate fentanyl interdiction effectiveness?
How do CBP seizures correlate with overdose death trends and domestic availability of illicit fentanyl?