How does the CBP One app process for asylum seekers work and what records are kept?
Executive summary
The CBP One mobile application is a DHS tool that became the primary channel for many asylum seekers to request appointments at U.S. land ports of entry beginning in 2023, a change that effectively conditioned timely asylum access on using the app in many cases [1][2]. The app schedules scarce daily appointment slots, conducts biographic and biometric vetting at intake, and stores or transmits users’ personal data to federal systems—practices that have prompted accessibility, privacy, and human‑rights concerns from advocates and international monitors [3][4][5].
1. How the appointment workflow operates in practice
Asylum seekers located in northern and central Mexico use CBP One to request an appointment to present at one of participating ports of entry; if an appointment is allocated through the app they must confirm within a set window or the slot is lost, a process CBP adjusted after technical failures caused timeouts and lost slots [6][7]. Appointments were capped and distributed across a limited set of ports—initially only eight southwest ports—meaning available daily slots (reported in some sources as roughly 1,450 across ports or hundreds of thousands requesting over time) were a small fraction of demand and produced long waits and crowded shelters in border cities [8][6][9].
2. What happens at the port of entry after an appointment
When a person with a CBP One appointment presents at a port of entry they are subject to CBP processing under immigration law that includes inspection, vetting, and placement into the asylum process if appropriate; CBP’s public materials emphasize biographic and biometric security vetting and background screening as part of that intake [3]. Legal consequences vary: policies and litigation around the “Asylum Ban” meant many without appointments were turned away and those processed could be paroled with a Notice to Appear following court injunctions, while others face presumptions of ineligibility for asylum if they did not use an app‑scheduled lawful pathway [7].
3. What personal and biometric records the app collects and where they go
CBP’s Privacy Impact Assessment and agency fact sheets confirm CBP One collects user biographic information and stores some data locally on the device, and that individuals processed at ports are subject to biometric collection and matching against government databases [4][3]. Independent reporting and procurement records indicate CBP and ICE have mobile biometric tools (e.g., Mobile Fortify) that capture faces, contactless fingerprints and identity documents and forward that data to biometric matching systems, which return possible matches and biographic links [10]. CBP also states that vetting includes biographic and biometric security vetting and background screening [3].
4. Data retention, sharing, and privacy concerns
CBP discloses in its PIA that CBP One raises privacy risks, that information may be stored locally on devices, and that personal data can be disclosed in response to legal process or for law‑enforcement purposes; advocates argue the app’s use of facial recognition, GPS, cloud storage and database matching creates significant human‑rights and surveillance risks [4][5][10]. Amnesty International and others have characterized the mandatory or effectively mandatory use of the app as violating the right to seek asylum and warned about indiscriminate or discriminatory surveillance stemming from biometric and location data collection [5][11].
5. Accessibility, operational limits, and critiques of fairness
Practitioners and NGOs document repeated technical failures, language and literacy barriers, limited device or connectivity access, and a randomized or scarce appointment distribution that favored those with stable internet or sponsors—criticisms summarized in reporting that labeled the system the “Ticketmaster of asylum” and documented uneven nationalities receiving appointments [7][9][11]. CBP counters that the app expanded “orderly pathways” and facilitated hundreds of thousands of appointments over time and that vetting via the app was designed to reduce smuggling and prioritize safety [3][8].
6. Limits of available reporting and contested claims
Public documents and NGO reports establish the app’s functions, vetting role, and privacy risks, but some operational details—such as exact retention schedules for specific data elements, the granular flow of device‑stored data into particular biometric indexes, and post‑processing uses by other agencies—are not fully disclosed in the cited public sources; where sources diverge, advocates emphasize rights impacts and CBP emphasizes orderly processing and security [4][5][3].