How have Colombian and Venezuelan drug routes changed since Maduro took power?
Executive summary
Since Nicolás Maduro’s rule (post-2013 and prominent through 2025) reporting and analysis say Venezuelan territory and officials increasingly figure in U.S. allegations about drug transit and state-linked corruption, while Colombia remains the dominant source of cocaine for the U.S. (84% per a 2025 DEA-cited report) [1] [2]. Recent U.S. kinetic actions — strikes on suspected smuggling boats and the November 2025 designation of “Cartel de los Soles”/Maduro-linked actors as terrorist — have accelerated visible shifts in tactics and routes, but experts warn flows are being diverted rather than stopped [3] [4] [5].
1. Old geography, new emphases: Colombia stays the production heart, Venezuela a tempting corridor
Long-standing drug-production geography remains: Colombia is still identified as the main producer for cocaine bound for the United States, with a 2025 DEA-linked figure saying 84% of cocaine seized in the U.S. originates in Colombia [1]. Multiple analysts and government reports referenced in recent pieces nonetheless document that Venezuelan territory has become an attractive transit corridor because of porous borders, weakened institutions, and the political-military control exercised by regime-aligned forces [2] [6]. That combination means routes through Venezuela have grown in strategic importance even though origin points remain largely Colombian [2] [1].
2. Violence at sea and policy shocks: U.S. strikes force traffickers to adapt
From September 2025 onward, U.S. military strikes on vessels suspected of trafficking — 21 boats hit and roughly 83 people reported killed in some accounts — mark a new, disruptive phase of counter‑drug operations in the Caribbean and southern approaches [3] [7]. Reporting and analysts say these operations have altered smugglers’ calculus: maritime routes that once left northern Colombia and Venezuela for the Caribbean are being risk‑priced by extra‑regional interdiction, prompting traffickers to re-route through different coasts, use air corridors more, or shift departure points toward Brazil, Guyana, Suriname or Colombia’s Pacific and Caribbean coasts [5] [4].
3. “Cartel de los Soles”: label, policy lever, and scholarly debate
The U.S. designation of “Cartel de los Soles” as a terrorist entity and the linking of Maduro and his allies to that label is shaping how routes are policed and how neighboring states react [8] [9]. Some U.S. officials and outlets portray the label as reflecting direct regime involvement in trafficking; others — including regional analysts and investigative outlets — argue the phrase describes a network of corruption, patronage and hybrid criminal–state arrangements rather than a classical, vertically integrated cartel [3] [5]. The label functions as both a legal tool (sanctions, expanded targeting) and a political lever that can shift interdiction priorities [9].
4. Diversion, not disappearance: how supply chains re-route
Multiple analysts warn that kinetic pressure and legal designations are unlikely to stop cocaine flows outright; instead, routes and modalities shift. Insight Crime and other analysts expect continued movement through southern Venezuela toward Guyana, Suriname and northern Brazil (routes oriented more toward Europe), while some loads stored in Colombia may bypass Venezuela and go directly from Colombia’s Caribbean or Pacific coasts through Central America or the Pacific toward the U.S. [5] [2]. Military and policy shocks also encourage traffickers to use air transport, island‑hopping via Caribbean territories, or to exploit weakly governed border zones — outcomes documented and predicted in the reporting and briefs [5] [6].
5. Politics shape intelligence and interpretation
How changes in routes are framed depends on political lenses. U.S. officials under the Trump administration framed strikes and designations as counter‑narcotics action tied to national security, while critics — regional governments, human‑rights groups and analysts — see elements of regime‑change pressure and question legality and motives [4] [10] [11]. International observers emphasize that opaque intelligence claims and heavy-handed strikes can push traffickers into more clandestine methods, complicating long-term interdiction [4] [11].
6. What the sources don’t settle: scale and central command
Available reporting documents route shifts, diversions, and policy moves, but sources do not settle whether Maduro personally runs a cartel in the classic sense, nor do they quantify exactly how much trafficking volume now transits Venezuela versus Colombia after 2017 — analysts differ and official evidence is contested [3] [5] [1]. Some sources describe Venezuela’s role as “systemic corruption” enabling transit rather than a single unified criminal enterprise [5] [6]. Precise flow volumes and the net effect of recent strikes on overall supply are not definitively resolved in the cited material [2] [5].
Conclusion: The evidence in current reporting shows that Colombian production has continued dominance while Venezuelan territory has become a more important and politicized transit corridor; recent U.S. military and legal moves are prompting diversionary changes in routes and methods rather than eliminating flows, and debate persists over the nature and scale of state involvement [1] [5] [9].