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What constitutional text and precedents define impeachable offenses for federal officials?
Executive summary
The Constitution plainly sets the textual floor for impeachable offenses: "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors" in Article II, Section 4, and treason itself is defined in Article III, Section 3 (citations: U.S. Const. Art. II, §4; Art. III, §3) [1] [2]. Beyond those words, Congress, historical practice, and scholarly essays—not the courts—have supplied the range of examples and interpretations, meaning political judgment and precedent drive application [3] [4].
1. The constitutional text — the starting point and its limits
The Constitution explicitly authorizes removal "on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors" (Article II, §4), and it separately defines treason in Article III, §3 [1] [2]. But the document does not define "bribery" in text (statutes later do) nor "high Crimes and Misdemeanors," leaving the core category indeterminate and open to interpretation [1] [5].
2. What "treason" and "bribery" mean in context
Treason has a narrow, textual definition—levying war against the U.S. or adhering to enemies and giving them aid and comfort—which constrains that particular ground for impeachment [2]. Bribery is not textually defined in Article II but has long been criminalized in federal law (for example, 18 U.S.C. §201 and early statutes), so Congress has a statutory frame to identify bribery allegations as impeachable conduct [2] [5].
3. "High Crimes and Misdemeanors": historical practice and ambiguity
The framers deliberately chose this phrase instead of broad "maladministration," anchoring impeachment in abuses of public trust and political crimes rather than any trivial misconduct; still, the phrase was left undefined and historically flexible [4] [1]. Scholarly and institutional histories trace the term to English impeachment practice, where it covered misconduct not always indictable as ordinary crimes [1].
4. Who decides what counts — politics, precedent, and Congress
Because the Constitution provides little operational detail, the House and Senate determine impeachability through investigations, articles, and trials; Justice Gerald Ford famously summarized the practical rule: "whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers it to be at a given moment in history" [6]. The Constitution makes impeachment a political-constitutional remedy administered by Congress rather than a legal question routinely resolved by courts [3] [5].
5. Precedent: past impeachments as guideposts (not hard rules)
Congressional practice—impeachments of presidents (e.g., Andrew Johnson, Bill Clinton, modern examples), judges, and other officers—has produced test cases that illuminate categories of conduct (abuse of office, obstruction, perjury, unlawful removals), but those cases do not create a single binding definition; they function as precedents that future Congresses cite and contest [7] [8] [9]. The Constitution Annotated catalogs these episodes and discusses jurisprudence across eras to show shifting standards [2] [4].
6. Institutional analyses and competing views
The Constitution Center warns a broad reading risks turning impeachment into a partisan weapon, while a narrow reading risks leaving serious abuses beyond remedy; both interpretations rest on tradeoffs between political accountability and institutional independence [10]. Library of Congress essays and law commentaries emphasize that the Framers intended impeachment to target political abuses—"political crimes"—but disagree on how wide that net should be in practice [4] [2].
7. Practical constraints and outcomes Congress can impose
Constitutional text limits impeachment remedies to removal and disqualification from future office; criminal prosecution after removal remains possible in ordinary courts [6] [8]. The Senate needs a two‑thirds vote to convict, and the House a simple majority to impeach—procedural thresholds that shape whether constitutional text becomes operative in any case [7] [11].
8. What reporting does not answer (limits of current sources)
Available sources outline the textual language, historical incidents, and institutional debates but do not present a single, definitive list of "all" impeachable acts—because none exists in the Constitution or statute and because interpretation changes over time [1] [4]. Sources do not provide a final judicial definition that would settle disputes over "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" because impeachment was designed as a political remedy [3] [6].
Conclusion — the practical rule: the Constitution sets the categories and floor (treason, bribery, other high crimes and misdemeanors) but leaves the decisive definition to Congress, guided by history, statute, and politics; scholars and institutions debate the right scope, producing competing warnings about excessive breadth or excessive narrowness [1] [10] [4].