Do Denmark, Andorra or North Macedonia use biometrics for passports, border control or e‑services—what are their official laws and agency policies?
Executive summary
All three countries issue biometric passports and are swept into Europe’s expanding biometric border architecture, but they differ sharply on domestic national ID cards and publicly documented e‑service biometric schemes: Denmark issues biometric passports and collects fingerprints and signatures for them under national practice though it formally opted out of some Schengen ID rules (while implementing them in national law) [1] [2] [3]; Andorra appears in official visa-exemption lists contingent on holders having biometric passports—implying issuance of ICAO‑compliant biometric travel documents—yet it does not issue a broad national electronic ID card like many EU states [4] [5]; North Macedonia issues ICAO‑standard biometric passports with photos and fingerprint data collected at passport centres [6].
1. Denmark: passports, border policy and the biometric footprint
Denmark has issued biometric passports since the mid‑2000s and requires digital photos, fingerprints and a digital signature in new passports—data collected through municipal or embassy channels with biometric capture equipment and special rules for overseas applications—making biometric passports standard Danish practice [1] [2] [7] [8]. Although Denmark formally did not take part in the EU/Schengen legislative act that mandated biometric features for passports, it nevertheless implemented those biometric passport requirements in national law, reflecting a deliberate national policy choice to align with ICAO and EU passport standards [3]. On border control, Denmark will participate in the practical effects of EU systems such as the Entry/Exit System (EES) and the forthcoming ETIAS travel‑authorization regime that rely on biometric passports for automated checks, because ETIAS and EES impose biometric-based processes on travellers to Schengen countries [9] [10]. Public documentation provided here does not detail Denmark’s broader use of biometrics for domestic e‑government services beyond passport issuance, and official agency policies on biometric reuse for non‑consular e‑services are not present in the provided reporting [7] [2].
2. Andorra: travel documents and the limits of national e‑ID
Andorra is repeatedly listed among countries whose nationals qualify for visa‑free travel to Denmark and other Schengen states only if they hold biometric passports, which indicates Andorra issues ICAO‑compliant biometric travel documents used for cross‑border identity checks [4]. At the same time, Andorra is flagged in overviews as a microstate that does not issue the kind of national biometric identity card common in continental Europe, suggesting a distinction between travel‑document biometrics and a domestic e‑ID program [5]. The sources do not provide an Andorran government law or agency policy document describing domestic biometric collection, use in e‑services, or any national digital ID strategy, so no definitive claim can be made from the supplied reporting about Andorra’s policies for biometric authentication in public e‑services; only the passport implication is documented [4] [5].
3. North Macedonia: passports and biometric enrolment at the counter
North Macedonia issues biometric passports that conform to ICAO standards, and its passport process includes collection of photographs, fingerprints and other biometric data at official Passport Application Centres, with a stated exemption for fingerprint collection from children aged 12 and under—an explicit administrative policy on biometric collection for travel documents [6]. That practice places North Macedonia among European countries that use fingerprint and facial biometrics for passports, and its passports carry the international biometric symbol on the cover [6]. The provided sources do not describe a separate national biometric ID card program for North Macedonia nor detailed laws governing the reuse of passport biometrics for domestic e‑services, leaving a gap in publicly available reporting on whether biometric enrolments for passports are repurposed by other agencies without additional legal safeguards [6] [5].
4. Regional architecture, interoperability and policy implications
Across these cases the dominant driver is travel interoperability: biometric passports are the gateway to automated border controls and EU/Schengen initiatives such as EES and ETIAS, which treat biometric travel documents as the norm and require travellers from visa‑exempt countries to hold ICAO‑compliant biometric passports for electronic pre‑travel authorizations [9] [10]. Denmark’s voluntary domestic implementation despite treaty opt‑outs illustrates an implicit agenda to maintain travel freedom and border efficiency, while Andorra’s and North Macedonia’s biometric passport practices reflect external pressures—visa reciprocity and interoperability—more than documented domestic e‑service strategies [3] [4] [6]. The supplied reporting does not include explicit national laws or agency privacy policies for biometric use in non‑passport e‑services for Andorra or North Macedonia, and while Denmark’s passport‑centric biometric policy is well documented, its broader e‑service biometric governance is not detailed in these sources [7] [2].