How did DHS deadly‑force policy change after 2021 and what effect did it have on ICE training and use‑of‑force incidents?
Executive summary
The Department of Homeland Security overhauled its Department‑wide Use of Force policy in 2023, building on work begun in 2021, to emphasize preservation of life, clearer prohibitions on deadly force (including limits against firing at moving‑vehicle operators), and mandatory changes to training on de‑escalation, duty to intervene and bias mitigation [1] [2] [3]. Those revisions required component agencies — including ICE — to issue updated policies and strengthen training, and DHS also began centralized data collection on use‑of‑force incidents in 2022, but independent reviewers warn the changes have not yet produced clear, definitive reductions in ICE deadly‑force incidents and gaps in reporting and oversight persist [2] [4] [5].
1. What changed in DHS deadly‑force policy after 2021
The 2023 DHS update tightened language around when deadly force is permissible, reiterating that officers may use deadly force only when they have a reasonable belief of an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury, and it explicitly proscribes deadly force in situations that threaten only property or self‑harm without imminent danger to others [1] [3] [6]. The department also incorporated explicit prohibitions — such as guidance that DHS law enforcement officers generally should not fire at the operator of a moving vehicle except under narrowly defined, justified circumstances — and elevated requirements that component agencies’ policies meet or exceed the departmental standard [3] [2] [6]. The update codified annual deadly‑force training and emphasized non‑deadly alternatives, wellness supports after incidents, and a duty to intervene for colleagues who use excessive force [2] [7].
2. How training for ICE and other DHS LEOs changed
DHS directed agencies to revise training curricula to prioritize de‑escalation, less‑than‑lethal options, the duty to intervene, and implicit bias awareness, and required annual deadly‑force training and demonstrated proficiency in de‑escalation techniques [2] [5]. ICE’s own 2021 Firearms and Use of Force Handbook and related directives already codified use‑of‑force continuums, annual instructor certification, supervisor reporting duties, and post‑incident support; the department‑wide updates compelled ICE to align these materials with the new DHS baseline and to shorten certain reporting timelines [8] [5]. Independent reporting and DHS press materials indicate the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers remain the baseline for basic training, while component review boards continued to analyze incidents for lessons learned and training adjustments [4] [8].
3. What effect these changes have had on ICE use‑of‑force incidents
Available federal reviews show mixed and limited results: DHS began centralized collection of use‑of‑force data in 2022 and GAO found most reviewed incidents in FY2021–2022 aligned with agency policy, but it also highlighted inconsistent reporting practices that can undercount uses of force and weaken trend analysis [4]. Reporting by outlets such as Business Insider and others documents that DHS and ICE now require annual deadly‑force training and de‑escalation proficiency, yet journalists and advocates have continued to surface new fatal encounters — indicating policy shifts have not eliminated controversial deadly‑force cases and that real‑world outcomes depend heavily on local operations and decisionmaking [5] [9]. Legal observers note that while policy language is stricter, judicial standards and Supreme Court precedent continue to give broad deference to split‑second officer judgments, complicating assessments of whether policy changes reduce fatalities [10] [11].
4. Oversight, data gaps and what remains unclear
GAO and other reviewers emphasized that DHS’s centralized data collection is recent and imperfect: agencies sometimes report multiple force events as a single incident, undercounting uses of force and limiting the ability to correlate training reforms with incident trends [4]. Independent external oversight remains fragmented — component review boards and internal OPR processes exist, but external investigative channels and public transparency vary, meaning it is currently difficult to draw causal conclusions that the 2021–2023 policy changes directly reduced ICE deadly‑force events [4] [5]. NPR, PBS and other outlets covering subsequent high‑profile shootings show competing narratives about whether agents followed updated training and rules, underscoring that policy text alone cannot substitute for independent, consistent after‑action investigation and public reporting [12] [9] [3].
Conclusion
DHS’s post‑2021 reforms tightened the written standard for deadly force, mandated enhanced annual training and de‑escalation proficiency, and centralized data collection — steps that, on paper, raise the threshold for lethal engagements and require ICE to change training and reporting [1] [2] [5]. However, federal reviews and journalism indicate those changes are recent, implementation and reporting remain uneven, and there is no clear, publicly verifiable evidence yet that the reforms have produced a sustained decline in ICE deadly‑force incidents; independent oversight, better data practices and transparent after‑action reviews are required to judge real‑world effects [4] [5].