Did the international court of justice find the Israeli prime minister to be a criminal
Executive summary
The International Criminal Court (ICC) — not the International Court of Justice (ICJ) — issued arrest warrants in November 2024 for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant after a Pre‑Trial Chamber found “reasonable grounds to believe” they bear criminal responsibility for certain war crimes and crimes against humanity related to the Gaza conflict [1] [2]. The ICJ, which adjudicates disputes between states and issues advisory opinions, has not “found” Netanyahu a criminal; its role and recent rulings in the broader Israel‑Palestine disputes are separate from the ICC’s individual criminal process [3] [4].
1. The court that acted: ICC’s arrest warrants and what they mean
On 21 November 2024 a three‑judge panel of the ICC’s Pre‑Trial Chamber I unanimously rejected Israel’s jurisdictional challenges and issued warrants of arrest for Netanyahu and Gallant, concluding there are reasonable grounds to believe they are criminally responsible as co‑perpetrators for the war crime of starvation as a method of warfare and for crimes against humanity including murder, persecution and other inhumane acts [1] [5] [2]. A Pre‑Trial Chamber’s finding of “reasonable grounds to believe” is a threshold for issuing warrants, not a trial conviction, and signals that the Prosecutor has made a prima facie case sufficient to require arrest and surrender for trial proceedings to follow [6].
2. Why this is often confused with the ICJ
Discussion has frequently conflated the ICC’s individual criminal process with actions at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), but the two bodies have distinct mandates: the ICC prosecutes individuals for international crimes while the ICJ resolves state‑to‑state disputes and treaty interpretation [4]. The ICJ has been engaged in separate proceedings — notably South Africa’s genocide case against Israel — but that court does not issue individual criminal warrants and has not declared Netanyahu a criminal [3] [4].
3. Practical limits: enforcement, jurisdiction and politics
The ICC has no police force and depends on states that are party to the Rome Statute to arrest and transfer suspects; Israel and the United States are not parties, complicating enforcement, while 124 or 125 member states are formally obliged to act if suspects enter their territory [7] [8]. States have reacted along political lines: some welcomed the warrants as a step toward accountability, others condemned or rejected them and raised legal and political objections, illustrating that execution of ICC orders depends as much on diplomacy and state practice as on legal findings [9] [10].
4. What the ICC actually concluded and what remains
The Pre‑Trial Chamber concluded there were reasonable grounds to believe Netanyahu and Gallant bore responsibility as civilian superiors for intentionally directing attacks against civilians and for other specified crimes during the relevant period, and it relied on the Court’s determination that its territorial jurisdiction covers Gaza and the West Bank [1] [11]. That conclusion initiates a criminal process: the warrants allow arrest and transfer for trial, but do not equate to guilt, and any conviction would require a full trial meeting the ICC’s standards of proof and procedural safeguards [6].
5. Competing narratives and stakes
Reactions reflect deep geopolitical fault lines: Israeli officials called the warrants biased and antisemitic, some leaders framed them as politically motivated, while human‑rights groups and some states framed them as overdue accountability for civilian suffering in Gaza; prominent commentators and legal analysts warned the decision could either bolster international justice or be used politically by domestic actors depending on subsequent developments [2] [8] [6]. The legal facts recorded by the ICC stand as a formal step in international criminal procedure, but the outcome and impact will be shaped by state cooperation, potential legal appeals, and the broader politics of the Israel‑Palestine conflict [9] [10].