What did the Justice Department inspector general’s Jan. 6 reviews actually say about confidential human sources?

1. What the inspector general documented about CHSs

Horowitz’s review cataloged the presence and activities of CHSs on Jan. 6: 26 people who had served as FBI confidential human sources were in Washington that day; of those, four entered the Capitol, 13 entered restricted grounds, and the rest remained outside those areas, and only three CHSs had been actively tasked by FBI field offices to report on specific domestic terrorism subjects for that event ^{[6] [1] [3]}. The report states explicitly that none of the CHSs were “authorized by the FBI to enter the Capitol or a restricted area or to otherwise break the law on January 6, nor was any CHS directed by the FBI to encourage others to commit illegal acts” ^{[7] [2]}.

2. What the review found the FBI did wrong about CHS intelligence collection

The central operational shortcoming the OIG identified was procedural: the FBI “did not canvass its field offices in advance of January 6, 2021, to identify any intelligence, including CHS reporting, about potential threats” tied to the Electoral Certification, a basic step the inspector general said limited the bureau’s situational picture ^{[4] [5]}. The OIG further concluded that, while the FBI recognized potential for violence and took steps in a supporting role, failing to solicit information from disparate field offices was a tactical mistake that likely prevented a fuller assessment of the risk picture ^{[1] [5]}.

3. What the report ruled out—and what it did not prove

The OIG review found “no evidence” in the materials and testimony it examined that the FBI had undercover employees in the crowds or at the Capitol, a conclusion that directly undercuts theories that federal agents provoked or orchestrated the breach ^{[5] [8]}. At the same time, the report does not claim to answer every conceivable question about all FBI interactions nationwide; it focused on whether the bureau exploited CHSs to incite the riot or withheld critical intelligence that others lacked, and it concluded it did not identify potentially critical intelligence in FBI hands that had not been shared with other law enforcement stakeholders before Jan. 6 ^{[9] [10]}.

4. Political reactions, information gaps and competing narratives

Republican critics seized on the presence of CHSs and on discrepancies in earlier FBI statements to demand fuller disclosure—Senate Judiciary figures like Grassley and Johnson pressed the OIG for all records—while some conservative outlets highlighted the raw count of informants as evidence of misconduct ^{[11] [7]}. Conversely, law-enforcement and mainstream outlets emphasized the OIG’s finding that no CHS was directed to break the law and the absence of undercover FBI agents in the crowd, framing the report as a rebuttal to “false-flag” narratives; both framings reflect partisan incentives to amplify either the CHS count or the exculpatory aspects of the findings ^{[12] [2]}.

5. The OIG’s remedial finding and the bottom line

Beyond cataloguing CHS presence, the OIG made a discrete recommendation: the FBI should assess and revise the policies and procedures it uses to prepare for events judged to present domestic security risks; the FBI agreed to that recommendation ^[9]. The bottom line in Horowitz’s review is twofold and straightforward: CHSs were present on Jan. 6, but the evidence assembled did not show the FBI authorized CHSs to break the law or used undercover agents to provoke the riot, even as the bureau’s failure to canvass field offices represented a meaningful intelligence lapse ^{[1] [4]}.