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Fact check: Which domestic terrorism ideologies have seen the most significant increase in recent years according to FBI reports?
Executive Summary
The available evidence shows white supremacist and anti‑government extremist ideologies have been repeatedly identified by federal investigations and congressional reviews as among the most significant domestic terrorism threats in recent years, while multiple 2025 studies and reports also document a notable rise in left‑wing or anti‑state violence in that year. Sources diverge on magnitude and timing: congressional and federal sources emphasize long‑standing increases in right‑wing violence and anti‑government activity [1] [2], whereas 2025 academic analyses argue left‑wing incidents surged and, in some measures, outpaced right‑wing attacks in 2025 [3] [4].
1. Why senators and agencies keep pointing at white supremacists — and what they actually reported
Congressional oversight and federal agencies have repeatedly labeled white supremacist and anti‑government movements as principal domestic threats, citing increases in attacks, plots, and cells that operationalize racially or ideologically motivated violence. A 2022 Senate investigative report, as summarized here, concluded that white supremacist and anti‑government ideologies represent the most significant terrorist threats and documented gaps in federal responses, framing these ideologies as a sustained and systemic concern [1]. The Biden administration’s strategic documents and memoranda reiterated that domestic terrorism and organized political violence have risen overall, spotlighting ideologies that target democratic institutions, including mentions of anti‑fascist rhetoric as implicated in some violent assaults [2].
2. New 2025 studies that say left‑wing attacks climbed sharply — what they found and how they differ
Multiple 2025 studies and analyses reported a marked uptick in left‑wing or anti‑state violence, arguing that 2025 marked the first time in decades that left‑wing incidents outnumbered far‑right attacks in certain datasets and timeframes. These studies document a rising average of left‑wing incidents from earlier years and project 2025 as on pace to be the left’s most violent year in three decades, attributing drivers to partisan polarization, anti‑government sentiment, and targeted actions against perceived state actors [3] [4]. These findings contrast with federal emphasis on right‑wing threats by focusing on short‑term surges and different classification criteria.
3. How classification choices and time windows shape who “increased the most”
Comparing conclusions requires attention to definitions, timeframes, and inclusion criteria. Federal and congressional reports often aggregate years of incidents and prioritize organized white supremacist and anti‑government networks [1] [2], while 2025 academic studies used shorter windows and incident counts focusing on 2025’s spike in left‑wing activity [3] [4]. Differences in coding — whether violent protests, targeted attacks, or plots are counted — and whether ideological overlaps (e.g., anti‑government sentiment within both left and right actors) are separated influence which ideology appears to have increased most.
4. Emerging non‑ideological threats that complicate the picture
Alongside traditional ideological categories, the FBI has emphasized novel threats from youth‑centric cybercriminal groups like “The Com,” whose motives range from financial gain and notoriety to retaliation, and whose activity blends cybercrime with real‑world harm. The bureau’s 2025 alerts describe thousands of affiliated individuals and splinter groups engaged in swatting, extortion, and violence, introducing a cross‑cutting violent threat not easily mapped onto classic left/right ideological binaries [5] [6] [7]. This development suggests analysts must account for hybrid actors when measuring “increases” in domestic violent activity.
5. Reconciling federal caution with academic urgency — agendas and incentives
Institutional actors and academic researchers bring different framings and incentives: congressional and federal documents emphasize long‑term threat assessment and resource allocation focused on organized white supremacist and anti‑government violence [1] [2], while recent academic studies highlight short‑term spikes and seek to alert the public to emergent left‑wing activity in 2025 [3] [4]. Both perspectives are fact‑based but serve different policy and scholarly agendas; readers should note that each framing selects different data slices and can understate the other’s concerns.
6. What the data convergence actually tells us right now
When synthesizing these sources, the strongest, cross‑cutting fact is that domestic terrorism has risen in multiple ideological streams, with federal oversight emphasizing sustained white supremacist and anti‑government threats and 2025 scholarship documenting a significant increase in left‑wing incidents in that specific year [1] [3]. Simultaneously, non‑ideological hybrid threats such as cyber‑enabled youth groups add complexity and indicate that raw incident counts alone do not capture threat severity, organization, or lethality [5] [7].
7. Bottom line for policymakers, journalists, and the public
Policy and reporting should reflect that no single ideology exclusively accounts for recent increases: long‑standing white supremacist and anti‑government violence remains a central federal concern, while 2025 saw a measurable surge in left‑wing attacks in some datasets, and cyber‑enabled groups complicate categorizations [1] [3] [6]. Decision‑makers must use transparent, consistent definitions, report multi‑year trends alongside year‑specific spikes, and track hybrid actors to form an accurate, actionable understanding of shifting domestic terrorism risks.