What elements must prosecutors prove to convict under 18 U.S.C. § 111 versus 18 U.S.C. § 372 in obstruction cases?
Executive summary
Federal prosecutors use 18 U.S.C. § 111 to target individual acts that “forcibly assault, resist, oppose, impede, intimidate, or interfere with” federal officers while they are performing official duties, and they use 18 U.S.C. § 372 to prosecute agreements by two or more people to prevent or obstruct federal officers from holding office or performing duties by force, intimidation, or threat [1] [2]. The core difference is that §111 focuses on the defendant’s individual conduct against a federal official and the nature of that act, while §372 criminalizes concerted agreement—i.e., a conspiracy—to impede or injure officers [1] [2].
1. What prosecutors must prove under 18 U.S.C. § 111 — the elements and their contours
To convict under §111, the prosecution must show that the defendant committed one of the statutorily listed acts—forcibly assaulting, resisting, opposing, impeding, intimidating, or interfering with a federal officer or employee—while that person was engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties; the statute and federal commentary make clear the victim must be a federal officer acting in an official capacity [1] [3]. Courts have read §111 broadly: a conviction does not require the government to prove a classic common-law “assault” when the indictment alleges other listed verbs such as resisting or impeding, so a showing that the defendant “forcibly” committed one of those acts suffices (United States v. Stands Alone) [4]. Prosecutors therefore typically focus on demonstrating forcible conduct that obstructed the officer’s duties, and when bodily injury or a dangerous weapon is involved they seek the statute’s enhanced felony penalties [5] [6].
2. The mental state under §111 — what intent must be proved
The statutory language and practice indicate that §111 targets willful, forcible conduct that interferes with official duties; prosecutors must prove the defendant acted knowingly or willfully with respect to the obstructive conduct, though courts have allowed a range of conduct—physical, non‑physical, direct, and indirect—to qualify as resistance or obstruction (for example, refusing to comply, blocking movement, or other obstructive acts) [1] [7] [5]. The exact jury instruction on mens rea can be outcome-determinative and varies with the charge’s subtype and alleged harm; available sources emphasize that prosecutors need to tie the defendant’s conduct to interference with the officer’s performance of duties [5] [3].
3. What prosecutors must prove under 18 U.S.C. § 372 — conspiracy’s core elements
Section 372 criminalizes concerted schemes: the government must prove at least two persons agreed to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any person from accepting or holding a federal office or to impede or injure a federal officer in the discharge of official duties, and that the agreement had that unlawful objective (text of the statute) [2] [8]. Unlike §111, §372 centers on the existence of a mutual agreement and the unlawful purpose of that agreement—proof of a defendant’s individual violent act is not the statute’s core; rather, prosecutors must show a conspiratorial combination to use force or intimidation to achieve the obstruction or injury [2].
4. The practical and prosecutorial differences — strategy, proof, and controversies
In practice prosecutors use §111 to attach liability to discrete, often observable acts against officers (useful when there is video or a specific altercation), while §372 allows charging groups or organizers when the government alleges a coordinated plan to obstruct enforcement—an approach highlighted in protest contexts where authorities label events “violent obstruction” and layer conspiracy counts [9] [7]. Defense lawyers and commentators warn that §372 can be used expansively to reach collective protest activity, and civil‑disobedience cases often prompt claims of prosecutorial overreach, meaning judges’ instructions and proof requirements (e.g., whether an overt act is required under a particular conspiracy theory) become contested—available public reporting does not settle every doctrinal nuance or jurisdictional split [10] [11].