What did the Eleventh Circuit specifically say when it admonished Judge Cannon for 'undue delay' in the Smith report proceedings?
Executive summary
A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concluded that U.S. District Judge Aileen Cannon “has not ruled or conducted any other further proceedings on the pending motions,” found that the petitioners “have established undue delay in resolution of their motions to intervene,” and held the mandamus petitions in abeyance while giving Cannon 60 days to resolve the motions before the court takes further action [1] [2] [3].
1. What the Eleventh Circuit wrote, in plain terms
The Eleventh Circuit’s short order pinpointed two core findings: first, that Judge Cannon had failed to act on motions that had been fully briefed for months — the panel explicitly said she “has not ruled or conducted any other further proceedings on the pending motions,” and second, that this inaction amounted to “undue delay,” which the panel said the petitioners had “established” as to their motions to intervene [1] [4]. The court therefore placed the parties’ petitions for writs of mandamus “in abeyance” and gave Cannon a 60‑day deadline to “fully resolve the motions” before the appeals court would consider stepping in or granting extraordinary relief [5] [3].
2. The mechanics: what the court ordered and the procedural stakes
Practically, the Eleventh Circuit did not immediately usurp Cannon’s authority; it suspended the appellate petitions for 60 days to give her an opportunity to rule, thereby signaling impatience but preserving the normal district‑court-first procedure [2] [4]. The appellate panel warned that if Cannon again failed to act within that window, the circuit would likely take further action — implicitly including granting mandamus or otherwise directing resolution — a step the court reserved by keeping the petitions pending rather than dismissing them outright [4] [3].
3. The timeline and factual record the circuit relied on
The panel noted that the transparency groups had filed motions in mid‑February and subsequently informed the district court months later that the motions had been fully briefed for more than 90 days, a chronology the circuit relied on in concluding petitioners met their burden to show “undue delay” [4] [5]. Multiple outlets summarized the same chronology: motions filed in February, fully briefed for months, and no intervening rulings or proceedings from Cannon up through the time the Eleventh Circuit issued its order [6] [1].
4. The broader context and competing narratives the court indirectly invoked
The appellate order landed against a backdrop in which Cannon had previously dismissed the underlying indictment and blocked release of Special Counsel Jack Smith’s report, moves that drew appellate scrutiny earlier in the case; commentators highlighted that the Eleventh Circuit’s rebuke represented another instance of the appeals court pushing back on delay or rulings in the Mar‑a‑Lago records litigation [1] [7]. Transparency groups framed the order as a win to end what they called obstruction; critics sympathetic to Cannon or to procedural caution might read the circuit’s restraint — holding petitions in abeyance rather than immediately granting relief — as respect for district court prerogative even while expressing impatience [5] [3].
5. Limits of the public record and what the order did not do
The order cited in reporting was short and targeted: it found undue delay, gave a 60‑day window, and left room for appellate intervention if the district court did not act [2] [4]. The publicly reported snippets do not include expanded reasoning beyond those points, and none of the sources provided a full transcript or opinion explaining the panel’s detailed legal analysis on standards for mandamus or the contours of “undue delay,” so any claim about deeper doctrinal justification would exceed the available reporting [3] [4].