What evidence did courts cite when allowing or dismissing civil claims against Bank of America and BNY Mellon in Epstein-related lawsuits?
Executive summary
A federal judge, Jed Rakoff, allowed two federal anti‑trafficking claims to proceed against Bank of America while dismissing all claims against Bank of New York Mellon, citing different standards of pleaded factual specificity and the legal requirement that a bank must have plausibly “knowingly benefited” from trafficking to be liable under the statute [1] [2]. Rakoff pared back the Bank of America complaint—rejecting claims of direct participation and general duty—while finding the remaining allegations sufficiently plausible to survive dismissal; by contrast he concluded the allegations against BNY Mellon were legally insufficient to sustain similar claims [2] [3].
1. What Rakoff said about Bank of America: plausible benefit plus notice
Rakoff found the complaint against Bank of America adequately alleged that the bank “benefited financially” from its relationship with Jeffrey Epstein while also alleging facts that could have put the bank on notice of red flags about Epstein’s activities, a mix of assertions the judge deemed enough to let two anti‑trafficking claims proceed into discovery and trial [2] [1]. At the same time Rakoff dismissed claims that required a higher showing—specifically allegations that the bank directly participated in Epstein’s sex trafficking or owed a general duty to protect victims—because the complaint did not plead the factual detail necessary to show such direct involvement or a legal duty beyond routine banking services [2].
2. Why BNY Mellon was dismissed: routine custodial work isn’t enough
The court threw out all claims against Bank of New York Mellon after determining the amended complaint failed to show the requisite state of mind or that BNY “participated in and benefited from” Epstein’s trafficking in the legally cognizable way the statute demands; Rakoff concluded processing large volumes of wire transfers and custodial functions, as pleaded, did not plausibly establish knowing facilitation of trafficking [3] [4]. Plaintiffs had alleged, for example, that BNY processed hundreds of millions of dollars tied to Epstein’s operations and extended financial services to entities like modeling agency MC2, but the judge found those allegations too thin to meet the legal standard for liability at the motion‑to‑dismiss stage [5] [1].
3. The evidentiary line courts require: plausibility, mens rea, and more than “routine” services
Across both rulings Rakoff focused on two legal thresholds: whether the complaint plausibly alleged that a bank knowingly benefited from trafficking (mens rea) and whether the factual allegations went beyond describing routine banking services; the Bank of America complaint met that plausibility test for two claims, while BNY’s did not as pleaded [2] [1]. Defense filings by both banks argued the complaints were “threadbare” or “razor‑thin,” contending the filings show only ordinary banking activity and lacked allegations tying specific employees’ knowledge to illicit conduct—arguments the court found persuasive as to BNY but not wholly persuasive as to the narrowed BoA claims [6] [7].
4. Contextual evidence plaintiffs relied on—and its limits
Plaintiffs pointed to transactional traces, alleged failures of due diligence (including claims Bank of America opened accounts with inadequate vetting and that BNY handled large transfers and credit facilities tied to MC2), and congressional interest and earlier settlements with other banks as circumstantial evidence that financial institutions enabled Epstein’s network [6] [5] [8]. Rakoff’s rulings illustrate the practical limit of such circumstantial evidence at the pleading stage: large dollar flows and regulatory reporting patterns can prompt discovery but do not automatically satisfy statutory culpability unless the complaint ties them concretely to the bank’s knowing facilitation [2] [4].
5. Competing narratives and what's next procedurally
Both banks denied wrongdoing and said they would vigorously defend themselves or appeal—the plaintiff’s lawyers signaled they would press on, including an appeal of the BNY dismissal—and Rakoff said he would issue a written opinion explaining his reasoning by February 13, with a May trial date set for the Bank of America claims that survived dismissal [2] [1]. The sector‑wide background—prior multi‑million dollar settlements with JPMorgan and Deutsche Bank and congressional probes—frames these suits as part of a broader accountability effort, but Rakoff’s decisions underscore the courtroom reality that statutory liability for trafficking hinges on particularized allegations of knowledge and benefit, not merely proximity to suspect funds [8] [2].