How has Mexico's production and trafficking of fentanyl evolved since 2015 and who controls it?
Executive summary
Since about 2015, fentanyl for the U.S. market shifted from being produced largely in Asia to being synthesized and pressed in Mexico, with Mexican cartels—primarily the Sinaloa Cartel (including Los Chapitos) and the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG)—emerging as the dominant producers, traffickers and distributors [1] [2] [3]. China remains the largest source of precursor chemicals and equipment, while Mexico has added controls on at least eight precursors and a domestic watchlist for more than a dozen others [4] [5].
1. The 2015 inflection point: from Chinese labs to Mexican factories
Beginning around 2015, publicly available reporting documents a turning point: Chinese manufacturers and exporters supplied most precursors and finished fentanyl earlier in the decade, but by about 2019–2020 production and large-scale pill-pressing shifted to Mexico where cartels built clandestine labs and tablet-pressing networks to serve U.S. demand [1] [6] [7]. Analysts and enforcement agencies trace that shift to Chinese precursor controls and cartels’ strategic choice to internalize production closer to the U.S. market [1] [6].
2. Who controls production inside Mexico: two cartels at the top
U.S. government and investigative reporting identify the Sinaloa Cartel (including the Los Chapitos faction) and CJNG as the principal Mexican organizations producing and trafficking fentanyl into the United States; both have been named in U.S. designations, sanctions and Treasury actions tied to fentanyl networks [2] [8] [9]. U.S. agencies say cartel personnel run clandestine labs, coordinate precursor procurement, and control trafficking corridors into U.S. border states [7] [3].
3. The supply chain: chemicals from abroad, manufacture in Mexico, distribution to the U.S.
Multiple sources agree on a three-part model: precursor chemicals largely originate from China and sometimes India, travel (legally or illicitly) to Mexico, are synthesized into fentanyl in Mexican clandestine labs, then pressed into pills or shipped in bulk into the U.S. via smuggling networks and legal ports of entry [4] [7] [6]. U.S. enforcement and Treasury actions emphasize that Mexican-based manufacturing relies on foreign-sourced inputs even as local production capacity has expanded [4] [10].
4. Adaptation and market maturation, not collapse
Reporting by InsightCrime and policy analysts finds that production is not simply rising or falling but maturing: cartels adapt to enforcement, change precursor inputs, and decentralize operations—moving labs, using smaller shipments, and experimenting with new chemical routes—so traditional interdiction faces limits [11]. Seizure data show volatility (peaking in 2023 then declining in some CBP measures), but sources caution that lower seizures do not necessarily reflect reduced production [12] [11].
5. Mexico’s regulatory response and its limits
Mexico has added controls—reportedly listing eight fentanyl precursors and maintaining a watchlist of a dozen-plus additional precursors—while U.S. reporting and diplomatic documents criticize corruption and capacity gaps that hamper counter-narcotics and anti-money-laundering efforts [4] [5]. Analysts note, however, that more than 3,100 chemicals can be used to make fentanyl, many of them common in industry and hard to regulate globally, complicating enforcement [4].
6. Enforcement, politics, and competing narratives
U.S. sanctions, Treasury designations, and law-enforcement cooperation have targeted cartel networks, chemical brokers, and front companies; Mexico has also carried out major seizures and arrests in coordination with U.S. partners [10] [13]. Political friction matters: U.S. moves to designate cartels as terrorist groups and freezes in aid programs have affected joint programs meant to intercept chemicals, illustrating how diplomacy and domestic politics shape operational responses [14] [15].
7. Open questions and what sources don’t say
Available sources document cartel control, precursor origins, seizures, sanctions and evolving tactics, but they do not provide definitive public data on total Mexican production volumes, the exact geographic distribution of active labs as of 2025, or a full breakdown of which cartel factions directly run each laboratory (sources summarize roles and seizures but do not quantify total output) [11] [3] [9]. Detailed, verifiable figures on production tonnage inside Mexico are not found in the cited reporting.
8. Implications for policy and enforcement
Reports and government statements converge on a dual reality: disrupting chemical supply chains from abroad (especially China) and strengthening Mexican interdiction and anti-corruption capacity are both necessary; yet cartel adaptation—smaller shipments, new precursors, domestic precursor lists—means unilateral interdiction will remain insufficient without international cooperation and targeted measures against financial networks and chemical brokers [4] [10] [11].
Limitations: this analysis draws exclusively on the provided sources and cites their principal findings. Where those sources disagree or leave facts unquantified I note the divergence or absence of data rather than infer unreported conclusions [4] [11] [2].