What exact language did the judge use regarding the alleged assault in court rulings or opinions?

1. The judge’s literal ruling: “The Court cannot find that Defendant’s alleged conduct was legislative in nature.”

In the reported opinion declining to dismiss one of three federal charges against Representative LaMonica McIver, Judge Semper wrote plainly that “The Court cannot find that Defendant’s alleged conduct was legislative in nature,” thereby rejecting a defense argument that the conduct fell within the scope of official legislative activity and was therefore protected; that same passage continues, “Her conduct was not tied to potential legislation or any other policy-making purpose,” phrasing the court’s core factual-legal determination about the nature of the interaction at issue ^[1].

2. How the judge’s phrase fits the procedural posture of the case.

Semper’s language appears in the context of a motion to dismiss, not a trial finding of guilt or innocence; the published report emphasizes that the court’s statement was part of the decision to deny dismissal and to proceed with at least one count — a procedural determination that the alleged conduct, if proven, could be criminal rather than shielded by legislative immunity or activity ^[1].

3. What the reporting does and does not show about other judicial comments on the alleged assault.

Beyond the quoted passages from Semper’s opinion, the supplied reporting does not include additional verbatim courtroom statements or a longer excerpt of the judge’s reasoning about the assault count, nor does it contain direct transcripts of oral remarks at hearings; therefore any further attribution of exact language to the judge would go beyond the record provided here ^[1]. Separate materials about judicial rhetoric and the sensitivity of language in sexual-violence contexts underscore why precise phrasing matters — judges are urged to remain neutral and careful in their language because sexual-assault cases are laden with myths and stereotypes ^[3] — but those sources do not supply more of Semper’s text.

4. Context from judicial-ethics and reporting sources that helps interpret the quoted language.

The U.S. Code of Conduct and related judicial-ethics guidance list sexual assault and abusive sexual conduct as forms of cognizable misconduct for judges and stress the importance of language and demeanor, which helps explain why media and legal observers pay attention to a judge’s exact words in cases involving alleged assault ^[2]. Reporting on workplace abuse in the federal courts also documents the stakes: when judicial language minimizes or mischaracterizes alleged sexual misconduct, it can shape victims’ willingness to report and public confidence in adjudication ^[4]. Those broader sources frame why Semper’s categorical phrasing — that the conduct wasn’t legislative in nature — is consequential for the case’s path, even though they do not expand on his precise wording beyond the quoted sentences ^{[2] [3] [4]}.

5. Alternative readings and the limits of available reporting.

One alternative interpretation is procedural: the judge’s words function as a narrow legal conclusion about legislative immunity rather than as a credibility or factual finding about whether an assault actually occurred; the news item itself indicates the ruling denied dismissal rather than resolving the ultimate factual dispute ^[1]. The limitation here is plain: the supplied reporting gives only the cited sentences from Semper and summaries of the ruling, so any fuller account of the judge’s contemporaneous courtroom remarks, longer opinion text, or transcripts would require consulting the underlying opinion or docket beyond the materials provided ^[1].