How do FBI statistics compare left wing and right wing violence in the US?
Executive summary
Across multiple datasets and official definitions, political violence in the United States has been dominated by right‑wing actors for much of the last decade, with right‑wing incidents historically accounting for the plurality or majority of domestic terrorist attacks and far more fatalities; however, several 2025 analyses and datasets document a notable uptick in left‑wing attacks that, for a short window in 2025, outnumbered right‑wing incidents — a shift driven more by a decline in other forms of violence and a small absolute rise in left‑wing plots than by a sustained reversal of long‑term trends [1] [2] [3].
1. The official framing: how the FBI and DHS define the problem
Federal agencies frame “domestic violent extremism” narrowly as violence or credible threats intended to influence government policy or intimidate civilians, a definition used in reporting and analysis of trends; that framing matters because it excludes non‑violent political aggression and shapes the incidents tallied in national statistics and academic datasets [4] [5].
2. Long‑run patterns: right‑wing violence has dominated fatalities and incident counts
Multiple long‑term studies and compilations show that right‑wing extremism has accounted for the majority of modern U.S. political violence and most politically motivated killings in recent years: researchers find roughly two‑thirds of domestic terrorism incidents historically tied to right‑wing actors, and watchdog counts note that politically motivated murders through 2022–2024 were overwhelmingly committed by right‑wing extremists [6] [7].
3. Recent perturbations: why 2025 looks different on some measures
Analysts at CSIS and other groups documented an uptick in left‑wing terrorist incidents in the first half of 2025 and even reported that left‑wing incidents outnumbered right‑wing ones in that specific period — a first in decades — but they stress that the increase starts from very low baseline levels and that the change is partly explained by a pronounced decline in right‑wing and jihadist incidents in that window, not only by a surge in left‑wing lethality [8] [2] [3].
4. Severity and lethality: right‑wing violence remains deadlier
Even where counts briefly tilted toward left‑wing incidents, multiple datasets and media analyses show right‑wing extremist violence has been more frequent and far deadlier overall in recent years; university tracking and investigative summaries conclude right‑wing attacks produce more fatalities and severe events than left‑wing attacks on average [5] [1].
5. Comparative probability and scholarly consensus
A multi‑dataset academic analysis led by University of Maryland researchers estimated the probability a violent extremist act in the U.S. would be committed by a left‑wing actor at ~0.33 versus ~0.61 for right‑wing actors (with Islamist/extremist probability similar to right‑wing), a quantitative finding that aligns with the broader scholarly consensus that right‑wing and Islamist extremists have been more likely to commit violent acts than left‑wing groups overall [1] [9].
6. Caveats, definitions and temporal context that shape interpretation
Readers should note important caveats: different trackers use different definitions (e.g., “attacks and plots” vs. “violent events”), short‑term comparisons (first half of 2025) can be driven by small counts and declines in other categories, and some high‑profile incidents can distort perceptions of trend direction; in other words, episodic increases in left‑wing incidents do not by themselves overturn a longer record in which right‑wing actors have accounted for most fatalities and many major plots [2] [3].
7. What the data implies for policy and public debate
Data across federal reporting, academic studies and think‑tank analysis suggests policy and enforcement should remain attentive to threats across the ideological spectrum: right‑wing violence remains the deadliest and most prevalent historically, but recent increases in left‑wing plots warrant updated monitoring and resources — and political actors who cite short windows of data to claim a permanent reversal are oversimplifying complex, shifting patterns [1] [8] [5].