How have specific federal courts ruled on grant‑conditioning tied to 8 U.S.C. § 1373 since 2017?

1. Early district‑court backlash: injunctions and constitutional rulings

Within months of the 2017 Executive Order targeting “sanctuary” jurisdictions, federal district courts issued injunctions blocking grant conditions tied to §1373 and in several cases held §1373—or the way the Administration sought to enforce it—unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment or impermissibly coercive under the Spending Clause; prominent district rulings found the Administration exceeded its authority when adding notice, access, and certification conditions to Byrne JAG awards ^{[1] [5] [6]}.

2. The circuit split on statutory authority: First, Third, Seventh vs. Second Circuit

On appeals the dispute fractured: the First, Third, and Seventh Circuits concluded the Attorney General exceeded the Byrne JAG statute because the phrase “applicable Federal laws” was reasonably read to mean laws governing the grant program itself, not general federal statutes like §1373—so conditioning Byrne JAG eligibility on §1373 compliance was statutorily improper ^[4]. By contrast the Second Circuit, in litigation brought by New York City, upheld the certification requirement, reasoning the Byrne statute’s certification and “form acceptable to the Attorney General” language gave the Attorney General authority to require compliance attestations and thus permitted conditioning grants on §1373 ^{[4] [3]}.

3. Ninth Circuit’s pragmatic dodge and remedy

The Ninth Circuit, confronted with multiple district judgments, declined to decide some of the sweeping constitutional claims, instead construing the statutory scheme and enjoining the contested grant Conditions as implemented—concluding that many facial Tenth Amendment challenges were unripe or mooted by the court’s statutory construction and its injunction against the Conditions ^[2]. That approach avoided a definitive Supreme Court‑level pronouncement on whether §1373 itself is commandeering.

4. How district courts framed the constitutional question

Several district courts went further than statutory interpretation and held §1373 (or the Executive Order’s efforts to enforce it through grant coercion) violated anti‑commandeering principles and the limits on conditional spending—finding that threatening to strip broad categories of federal funding or forcing local officials to use their resources for federal immigration enforcement crossed constitutional lines ^{[1] [5]}. Those courts tied their reasoning to Supreme Court anti‑commandeering precedents and Spending Clause limits.

5. The political and legal subtext — agendas and consequences

Judicial rulings split not merely on law but on institutional posture: courts stressing statutory text curtailed administrative reach (First/Third/Seventh), while the Second Circuit’s deference empowered executive grant‑making flexibility ^{[4] [3]}; plaintiffs—cities and states—framed the issue as federal overreach and protection of local policing priorities, while the DOJ framed the conditions as proper uses of the Spending Clause to ensure compliance with federal law and public safety priorities ^{[1] [7]}. Observers note that litigation strategy and forum selection shaped outcomes and that appellate avoidance of the constitutional question preserved ongoing uncertainty ^{[2] [1]}.

6. Remaining legal status and limitations of the record

The resulting case law leaves no single, nationwide rule: some circuits blocked grant‑conditioning on statutory grounds, one circuit upheld it in at least one context, and district courts have sometimes declared §1373 unconstitutional while appellate courts have often sidestepped that constitutional holding by resolving cases on narrower grounds ^{[4] [2] [1]}. Reporting and the sources provided do not record a final Supreme Court resolution of §1373’s constitutionality or an across‑the‑board appellate consensus; therefore the law remains fragmented and fact‑bound ^{[1] [2]}.