How have federal courts ruled on the administration’s use of interim appointments and what precedents affect U.S. attorney appointments?

1. Recent courtroom rebukes: Halligan and Sarcone decisions

Trial judges have recently invalidated high-profile interim appointments and the actions taken by those appointees: a federal district judge concluded Lindsey Halligan’s appointment as interim U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia was unlawful and dismissed indictments she signed, ruling that her appointment violated statutory limits and the Appointment Clause ^{[1] [3]}, and a separate judge found John Sarcone III’s appointment unlawful and quashed subpoenas he signed, rejecting parts of the government’s investigative authority under that appointment ^[4].

2. The statutory tug-of-war: Section 546 versus the Vacancies Act

At the heart of these decisions is 28 U.S.C. § 546, which authorizes a 120‑day interim appointment by the Attorney General and then shifts appointment power to the district court if the vacancy persists, a text courts and commentators say is ambiguous about whether successive AG appointments restart the 120‑day clock; that statutory ambiguity has produced divergent rulings about when an interim appointment lawfully expires ^{[5] [2] [6]}.

3. Case law fractures and the “first appointment” reading

Some trial courts have adopted a constraining reading: the 120 days run from the first invocation of Section 546 after a confirmed U.S. Attorney leaves, so later AG reappointments do not reset the clock, a view used to void later interim service (notably in the Habba-related litigation and in courts confronting repeated AG appointments) and relied on by judges who dismissed prosecutions or invalidated subpoenas ^{[2] [3]}.

4. Countervailing precedents and administrative practice

But courts and government auditors have not been uniform: the Government Accountability Office and a leading district-court decision (In re Grand Jury Proceedings) recognized circumstances in which the Attorney General may make a permissible second interim appointment—particularly where a presidential nominee is pending and the district court declines to appoint—creating a competing line of authority that preserves some executive flexibility ^{[7] [6]}.

5. Constitutional overlay: Appointment Clause challenges

Beyond statutory parsing, at least one judge concluded an interim appointment violated the Constitution’s Appointment Clause because the appointee was not confirmed and was not appointed in a manner Congress authorized, a holding that converted a statutory defect into a constitutional infirmity and rendered all actions taken by that appointee void in that case ^[3].

6. Practical effects and institutional responses

The immediate consequence has been litigation-driven instability: indictments and subpoenas have been dismissed or rejected where courts found appointments unlawful, courts have issued vacancy announcements setting explicit 120‑day limits for interim service, and the Department of Justice and courts continue to litigate the interaction between Section 546 and the Vacancies Reform Act while the Senate confirmation process remains the constitutional backstop ^{[8] [6] [1]}.

7. The open legal horizon: ambiguity, splits, and the Supreme Court’s potential role

Because lower-court decisions conflict and statutes admit multiple plausible readings, observers note unresolved legal questions could be ripe for higher‑court review; the Supreme Court’s docket and interest in separation‑of‑powers and appointment issues this term signal a plausible path to resolution if courts of appeals or the high court take up the split ^{[9] [10]}.

8. Bottom line: precedents that matter going forward

Future enforcement and prosecutions will turn on (a) how courts interpret the 120‑day rule in 28 U.S.C. § 546 and its interplay with the Vacancies Reform Act, (b) whether courts continue to apply the Appointment Clause to void actions taken by improperly installed interim attorneys, and (c) whether appellate courts endorse the GAO/Grand Jury line permitting some second appointments when nominations are pending—precedents that together will define how far administrations can go to staff U.S. Attorney offices without Senate confirmation ^{[5] [2] [7] [3]}.