What federal statutes have been used to charge legally armed protesters who interacted with federal agents?
Executive summary
Federal prosecutors have most commonly relied on the assault-and-impeding statute, 18 U.S.C. §111, to charge protesters who have physically confronted or interfered with federal agents; more sweeping charges—like rebellion/insurrection under 18 U.S.C. §2383—have been invoked more rarely and in higher‑threshold contexts; administrative and regulatory provisions (for example, 43 C.F.R. rules) and state anti‑militia statutes have also been applied in related cases depending on conduct and venue [1] [2] [3] [4] [5].
1. 18 U.S.C. §111: The workhorse for protest‑related federal prosecutions
The statute that prosecutors turn to most often is 18 U.S.C. §111, which criminalizes assaulting, resisting, opposing, or otherwise interfering with federal officers while they perform official duties; it covers conduct ranging from simple assault (a misdemeanor) to aggravated assaults involving weapons or serious bodily injury with felony penalties [1] [6] [7]. Legal commentators and defense firms emphasize that §111 has a broad reach in protest contexts—covering not only direct blows but claims that protesters “forcibly impeded” agents trying to enter or exit a facility—and that its application often depends on video, reports, and disputed factual issues about intent and force [8] [2] [9].
2. 18 U.S.C. §2383 and the leap from protest to insurrection
When allegations involve organized, armed resistance directed at government authority, prosecutors have tools like 18 U.S.C. §2383 (rebellion or insurrection), which makes it illegal to incite, assist, or participate in a rebellion against the United States; the statute is framed for organized attempts to overthrow or obstruct governmental authority and has been prominent in national conversations since the January 6 prosecutions [3] [10]. Use of §2383 is far narrower in practice: it requires facts pointing to a coordinated effort to resist the government rather than ordinary confrontations at demonstrations, and legal sources stress the concept’s high bar and rare application in standard protest policing [3] [10].
3. Regulatory and administrative provisions: venue, federal property, and interference rules
Beyond Title 18 criminal provisions, federal regulations governing conduct on federal lands and at federal facilities can form the basis for charges or administrative penalties—such as regulations that forbid impeding federal employees or disturbing agency functions (for example, 43 C.F.R. §423.22)—and these rules are often used where the alleged interference occurs on particular federal property [4]. Such regulatory violations can be charged alone or bundled with criminal counts, and they matter when federal agents are performing statutory duties at a site that triggers agency jurisdiction [4].
4. State anti‑militia laws and the line between armed protest and unauthorized paramilitary activity
When protesters are armed and operating in organized, paramilitary fashion, prosecutors and civil authorities may look to state statutes that prohibit private military organizations, false assumption of military or police authority, and similar offenses; a national guide documents numerous state laws that bar unauthorized militia activity, parades with firearms, or wearing military uniforms that could confuse the public [5]. These state provisions have been used to address the conduct of self‑styled “militia” groups at demonstrations even when federal criminal statutes are not invoked, and they illustrate a jurisdictional split where both federal and state levers can be deployed [5].
5. Context, prosecutorial choice, and competing narratives
Which statute is used depends heavily on facts, venue, and prosecutorial strategy: §111 is routine where there is alleged physical interference or threats against federal agents, §2383 is reserved for alleged organized attempts to obstruct government authority, regulatory provisions apply on federal lands, and state anti‑militia laws fill gaps involving paramilitary behavior; critics warn that broad application of §111 can chill lawful protest and that selective charging decisions can reflect political or institutional agendas—an issue underscored by reporting on federal tactics and civil‑liberties complaints in cities like Minneapolis [2] [8] [11]. Sources differ on emphasis: defense and civil‑liberties observers stress civil‑disobedience and First Amendment issues in §111 cases, while prosecutors highlight officer safety and the need to deter armed interference with federal duties [8] [2] [11].