What federal statutes specifically define obstruction or assault on a federal officer that prosecutors use in ICE-interference cases?
Executive summary
Federal prosecutors most commonly rely on 18 U.S.C. § 111 (assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain officers) and obstruction statutes in Title 18 — frequently cited is 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (obstruction of justice) and other provisions in Chapter 73 of Title 18 — when charging people accused of interfering with ICE operations [1] [2] [3]. Legal practitioners and firm write‑ups show these statutes are often charged together or alongside related federal and state counts, with penalties that range from misdemeanors to decades in prison depending on force and injury [4] [5].
1. What prosecutors most often invoke: 18 U.S.C. § 111 (assault, resisting, impeding)
The statute most frequently cited in ICE‑interference prosecutions is 18 U.S.C. § 111, which makes it a federal crime to “forcibly assault[], resist[], oppose[], impede[], intimidate[], or interfere[]” with federal officers performing official duties; the text enumerates covered federal personnel via cross‑reference to §1114 [1]. Practice guides and defense firms handling ICE protests confirm prosecutors commonly use §111 in both misdemeanor and felony forms depending on whether force or serious bodily injury is alleged, and note enhanced penalties where serious injury occurs [4] [5].
2. The obstruction arsenal: 18 U.S.C. § 1503 and Chapter 73 provisions
Defense and criminal‑law resources point to obstruction charges under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (obstruction of justice) as a frequent vehicle for alleging interference with federal officers during an arrest or enforcement action [2] [3]. Chapter 73 of Title 18 contains multiple obstruction‑related statutes — including, in other contexts, provisions addressing witness tampering, destruction of records, and obstruction of agency proceedings — that prosecutors can analogize or deploy when conduct impedes federal functions [3].
3. How statutes are applied in the ICE context and charging strategy
Reporting from law firms and legal blogs shows prosecutors typically allege that physically blocking vehicles, surrounding agents, or otherwise preventing agents from carrying out arrests constitutes obstruction or falls within §111’s prohibitions; meanwhile, providing false information, shielding a person (harboring), or conspiracy theories may generate additional counts under other federal statutes [2] [6] [7]. These sources warn that recording agents alone rarely triggers such charges unless paired with conduct that physically impedes operations [2] [8].
4. Penalties, charging range, and prosecutorial discretion
The statutory framework produces a spectrum of punishments: §111’s basic scheme can carry up to one year for “simple” offenses and far greater penalties when serious bodily injury or use of a deadly weapon is involved — defenses and firm analyses cite potential multi‑year felony exposure in those circumstances [4] [5]. Obstruction charges under §1503 and related Chapter 73 provisions likewise run from misdemeanors to significant felonies depending on the subsection and factual predicates, and practitioners emphasize that charging choices rest largely with federal prosecutors and the factual record [3] [2].
5. Other federal statutes and parallel charges often paired with §111/obstruction
Beyond §111 and obstruction statutes, legal commentary notes prosecutors may tack on related federal counts such as conspiracy, false statements, and immigration‑specific offenses (for example, harboring or transporting undocumented persons) depending on the conduct alleged, and may also pursue state or local trespass/riot statutes in parallel [6] [9] [7]. Congressional and policy summaries reiterate that ICE operates under statutory authorities that intersect with multiple criminal provisions, which creates overlapping options for charging [10].
6. Limits of the available reporting and how to read it
The sources collected are primarily law‑firm guides, legal information summaries, and LII statutory text excerpts that consistently point to §111 and obstruction (including §1503 and Chapter 73) as prosecutors’ go‑to statutes in ICE‑interference cases; they do not provide a statistical breakdown of how often each statute is used in federal indictments nor exhaustive prosecutorial memos, so gaps remain about charging patterns in specific districts [2] [3] [1]. Readers should treat these cited practice pieces as authoritative summaries of the statutory tools prosecutors prefer, while recognizing that case law and local U.S. Attorney priorities ultimately shape charging decisions [4] [10].