Which federal statutes are most often used to prosecute AI‑generated CSAM and what sentencing ranges do they carry?
Executive summary
Federal prosecutors typically rely on the core federal child‑pornography statutes—most notably 18 U.S.C. § 2252 and § 2252A—and related provisions such as 18 U.S.C. § 2251 and the definitional statute 18 U.S.C. § 2256 when pursuing cases involving AI‑generated CSAM, and courts have treated knowing possession, distribution, and production of synthetically generated CSAM as criminal under those provisions [1] [2] [3]. Sentencing can be severe: published reporting and practice guides show mandatory minimums and high upper ranges for federal CSAM offenses (examples include multi‑decade sentences in high‑profile cases and reported statutory minimums ranging from about five years to statutes captioned with 15‑year minimums in some analyses), while legislative proposals such as the ENFORCE Act aim to equalize and stiffen penalties for AI‑generated CSAM [4] [5] [6] [7].
1. The statutory toolbox prosecutors use: §§2252, 2252A, 2251 and the definition in §2256
Prosecutors most often charge CSAM cases under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252 and 2252A, which criminalize the knowing receipt, distribution, reproduction, and possession of child sexual abuse material and explicitly encompass computer‑generated or digitally altered material that is “virtually indistinguishable” from images of real children [1]. Where images arise from conduct that produced sexual visual depictions of an actual minor or used a minor in creation, § 2251 (sexual exploitation of children) is a common additional vehicle; and § 2256 supplies the statutory definition that reaches visual depictions that “appear to be” minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct—language that federal guidance and state reports say can be read to cover AI‑generated imagery [1] [3]. Law firms, advocacy groups, and law enforcement have repeatedly cited these statutes as the primary instruments used today to pursue AI‑related CSAM [2] [6].
2. Obscenity and other statutes for wholly fictional AI content: a contested backstop
Some specialists and policy groups argue that when imagery is wholly fictional and does not depict a real, identifiable child, prosecutors may have to lean on obscenity law or other federal statutes as an alternative charging theory—an approach Thorn and other advocates have urged to address gaps in older statutes [8]. Thorn’s account and other policy pieces say wholly AI‑generated depictions that do not depict a real child have historically been prosecuted under federal obscenity provisions, producing inconsistent outcomes and prompting legislative fixes [8]. That position is echoed by legislative sponsors of the ENFORCE Act, who have framed part of the problem as statutory gaps that yield divergent charges and penalties for similar conduct [7].
3. What sentences look like in practice: mandatory minimums, long terms, and outlier cases
Federal practice shows a wide—but generally severe—range of penalties. Published materials and law‑practice guides note mandatory minimum terms for certain CSAM offenses (for example, analyses cite five‑year minimums for distribution offenses and other commentaries reference statutory schemes yielding 15‑ to 30‑year ranges in some contexts), and prosecutors have obtained multi‑decade sentences in high‑profile AI‑linked matters—for example, a recently reported federal case in which a defendant received a 40‑year sentence in a prosecution that included use of AI to create CSAM [6] [5] [4]. Legal analysts caution that sentencing varies with the specific statute charged, the defendant’s criminal history, the number and nature of images, and whether the government secures enhancements—hence the practical disparity in exposure when charges are framed under different statutes [5] [6].
4. The policy fight and why charging choice matters
Legislators and advocates are pushing to standardize penalties for AI‑generated CSAM because charging under obscenity law versus the child‑pornography statutes can produce markedly different sentencing outcomes, statute‑of‑limitations rules, and registration consequences; the ENFORCE Act explicitly seeks to require that AI‑generated CSAM crimes “receive the same sentencing as other CSAM offenses” and to remove the statute of limitations in such cases [7] [8]. State law diversity compounds the picture: dozens of states have moved to criminalize AI‑edited or AI‑generated CSAM in different ways, producing a patchwork that federal prosecutors and defense counsel must navigate [9] [3]. Sources agree federal law already reaches many forms of AI CSAM, but they also document legal uncertainty and policy efforts to close gaps and make penalties uniform [2] [7].
5. Limits of the record and practical takeaway
The available reporting documents prosecutors using §§ 2252/2252A/2251 and §2256 definitions, notes instances of severe sentences including a 40‑year term in a recent case, and flags that some wholly synthetic imagery has been prosecuted under obscenity frameworks—while legislative proposals aim to harmonize punishments [1] [4] [8] [7]. The record provided does not supply a catalogue of every statute invoked in every case or a mechanically precise sentencing table; therefore, readers should view cited minimums and examples as illustrations drawn from reporting and practice pieces rather than an exhaustive statutory sentencing chart [6] [5].