What policies govern retention and release of agent communications (Signal/Slack/texts) in federal use‑of‑force investigations?

Checked on February 6, 2026
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Executive summary

Federal use-of-force policies require prompt reporting, preservation of evidence, and internal review by component investigative offices, and the Justice Department and DHS have issued updated standards that tighten oversight and data collection; however, publicly available federal guidance in the provided reporting does not lay out a single, cross‑cutting rule that explicitly names or details retention and public release rules for communications on encrypted apps such as Signal or workplace platforms like Slack [1] [2] [3].

1. What the Justice Department and DHS require in principle: reporting and preservation

The Department of Justice’s updated use‑of‑force policy and related Justice Manual establish that officers and agents must report uses of force, that internal components must investigate significant incidents, and that agencies must preserve evidence and training records to support accountability and potential criminal or administrative actions [1] [2]. The Department of Homeland Security’s 2023 use‑of‑force update similarly emphasizes de‑escalation, documentation, and that significant incidents should trigger reviews that may require retention of “communications” as part of case records, without prescribing specific IT or app‑level rules in the public policy text [3] [4].

2. How “communications” are treated in federal information‑sharing and evidence frameworks

Government audits and guidance note that law enforcement information often requires protection as sensitive but unclassified to shield investigative methods and pretrial evidence, and that the federal government historically lacked uniform policies for sharing and protecting such material across agencies—an institutional problem that affects access to messages and other electronic records tied to use‑of‑force probes [5]. GAO and DOJ materials point to the need for clearer processes for aggregating and publishing use‑of‑force data, implying agencies must collect and retain records reliably even if publication timelines and scope are uneven [6] [2].

3. Who controls release to outside investigators or the public?

When investigations are internal or concurrent with state or federal criminal probes, release decisions are governed by the component with investigative responsibility and by coordination protocols; the Justice Department’s fact sheet and public reporting note strengthened communication channels for pattern‑and‑practice and civil rights inquiries and that federal investigatory authorities sometimes limit external access to evidence while investigations are ongoing [2] [7]. The public documents show agencies asserting the need to protect investigative integrity rather than offering a single release formula, which can lead to disputes between federal and state investigators over evidence access [7].

4. Practical implications for Signal, Slack, text messages and similar records

The reviewed sources require preservation of evidence and recognize electronic records as potentially critical, but none of the provided policies explicitly name encrypted messaging apps (e.g., Signal) or commercial collaboration platforms (e.g., Slack) or prescribe retention intervals, collection methods, or decryption obligations for those specific technologies in use‑of‑force cases; that absence means case‑by‑case practices—driven by component rules, internal IT retention policies, and investigative subpoenas or legal process—determine whether and how such messages are captured and later released [1] [2] [5].

5. Where the public record is thin and what that means for transparency

The combination of updated use‑of‑force directives and GAO findings shows an institutional push toward better data collection and accountability, yet the sources reveal gaps on operational details—especially around modern, encrypted communications—creating ambiguity that fuels disputes over transparency and access during high‑profile use‑of‑force investigations [2] [6] [5]. The public reporting from PBS underscores that federal agencies have, at times, withheld evidence from state investigators during concurrent probes, illustrating how policy lacunae translate into contested evidence control in practice [7].

6. Bottom line: defined duties, undefined mechanics

Federal policy documents in the record mandate preservation, reporting, internal investigation, and improved interagency coordination for use‑of‑force incidents, and auditors call for clearer sharing rules, but they stop short of a uniform, public directive describing retention windows, collection protocols, or release criteria specifically for Signal/Slack/texts—leaving operational control to agency components, investigatory leaders, and applicable legal processes, and creating room for contested access and varied transparency outcomes [1] [2] [5] [6].

Want to dive deeper?
Which federal agencies have published internal IT retention policies that cover messaging apps and workplace chat platforms?
How have courts ruled on compelled production or decryption of encrypted messages in law enforcement investigations?
What mechanisms exist for state investigators to obtain federal evidence during concurrent use‑of‑force probes?