How many civilians versus combatants have been killed in Gaza since October 2023?
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Executive summary
Different tallies and academic studies disagree sharply on how many Gaza fatalities since 7 October 2023 were civilians versus combatants. Gaza health authorities and the UN report tens of thousands of total deaths without separating combatant status (MoH/UN figures cited in reporting at least ~62,000–67,000 by 2025) [1] [2]; peer‑reviewed and modelling studies estimate about 64,260 traumatic injury deaths to June 30, 2024 (LSHTM/Lancet) and modelled that only roughly 12.7% of deaths in the 2023 fighting were combatants — implying a large civilian majority — while Israeli military claims have ranged up to ~17,000–20,000 Hamas fighters killed, implying a higher combatant share [3] [4] [1] [2].
1. The raw official tallies: total deaths, but no clear civilian/combatant split
Palestinian health authorities and UN briefings report overall death counts in the tens of thousands for Gaza since October 2023 but do not publish a disciplined breakdown into “combatant” and “civilian” categories; reporting cited more than 62,000 killed as of mid‑2025 and Reuters noted Gaza health authorities saying more than 67,000 by October 2025 [1] [2]. These aggregated tallies are the basis for many public statements but explicitly do not distinguish combatant status [2].
2. Independent epidemiology — higher total deaths and a civilian majority
A capture–recapture analysis published in The Lancet and reported by LSHTM estimated 64,260 traumatic injury deaths from 7 October 2023 to 30 June 2024 — roughly 41% higher than the Gaza Ministry of Health’s contemporaneous figure — and concluded the majority (59.1%) of those deaths were among women, children and older people, groups considered unlikely to be combatants [3] [4]. That study warns it does not count indirect deaths from disrupted health services and therefore likely underestimates the full mortality impact [4].
3. Modelling of combatant versus civilian proportions points to a very high civilian share
A modelling study comparing Israel–Gaza conflicts estimated that in the 2023 confrontation the proportion of deaths categorized as combatants was only 12.7% (95% UI: 9.7–15.4%), a dramatic shift from earlier conflicts and implying civilians were the primary objects of lethal force [5]. That work uses age‑sex profile assumptions and historical databases to infer combatant status where direct labeling is unavailable [5].
4. Israeli military claims — higher combatant counts, different interpretation
Israeli official statements and reporting have given much higher counts of militants killed: the IDF asserted by January 2025 that nearly 20,000 Hamas fighters had been killed, and earlier government figures spoke of 17,000–18,000 combatants; commentators have used Israeli internal databases to suggest other ratios, and some Israeli officials at times claimed lower civilian proportions [1] [2] [6]. These claims, however, rely on the IDF’s own classification methods and are contested by other researchers and NGOs [6].
5. Why the numbers diverge: methods, incentives, and data gaps
Disagreement stems from differing methodologies and incentives: Gaza’s MoH compiles morgue/hospital records that don’t classify combatant status [7] [2], ACLED and others reconcile MoH and IDF reporting and note methodological tradeoffs that can bias toward recording IDF‑claimed combatant deaths when available [8]. Peer‑reviewed capture–recapture methods attempt to correct undercounting [4]. Model-based age/sex classification infers combatant status where no direct label exists [5]. Political actors have clear incentives to emphasize either civilian suffering or militant losses; those incentives shape public figures [6] [1].
6. What can reasonably be stated today
Available sources show: (a) total death counts for Gaza are in the tens of thousands but aggregated tallies rarely separate combatants and civilians [1] [2]; (b) independent studies estimated ~64,260 traumatic injury deaths to 30 June 2024 and find a majority of those deaths were among groups unlikely to be combatants [3] [4]; and (c) modelling work estimates only ~12.7% of 2023 conflict deaths were combatants, while Israeli military claims put militant deaths much higher [5] [1] [2]. All three types of sources are in active dispute with one another [6] [5].
7. Limitations and the unanswered questions
Key limitations remain: Gaza MoH counts do not distinguish combatant status [7] [2]; capture–recapture and modelling rely on assumptions about underreporting and age‑sex combatant likelihoods [4] [5]; and IDF combatant tallies depend on military classification processes that external researchers find contestable [6]. Available sources do not mention a single, independently audited roster that unequivocally separates civilian and combatant deaths for the full period since October 7, 2023 [7] [2] [4].
8. Bottom line for readers
There is strong, peer‑reviewed evidence that a large majority of Gaza’s traumatic injury deaths were civilians and that total deaths were substantially undercounted by local reporting [4] [3]. Israeli official counts of Hamas fighters killed are higher and produce a different civilian/combatant ratio; both positions rely on different data streams and assumptions and therefore produce incompatible tallies [1] [2] [6]. Further independent, transparent, case‑level verification would be required to resolve these disputes — such verification is not presented in the sources reviewed here [7] [4].