What specific ballot-handling errors did the Georgia Secretary of State report in its investigation?

1. What the Secretary of State’s public materials in this set cover — audits, ballot images and voter tools

The Georgia Secretary of State’s public pages in the provided material describe routine administration tasks — hand counts as part of statewide audits, a Ballot Image Library, My Voter Page tools and calendar notices — but they do not enumerate an official list of discrete ballot‑handling mistakes discovered in an SOS investigation ^{[4] [1] [5] [6] [7]}. In other words, the department materials cited focus on procedures and services (sample ballots, audits and risk‑limiting audits) rather than publishing a line‑by‑line error inventory ^{[4] [7]}.

2. Independent error analysis cited in these results — the Grady County SLOG claim

A local analysis highlighted in Georgia Record alleges a high error rate in Grady County: the “2024 Grady County… SLOG Error Analysis Report” claims 284 QR‑code signature mismatch errors in 10,768 ballots (~366,112 ballot positions) and argues that this indicates a systemic problem requiring investigation or decertification of equipment ^[3]. That finding is presented by an external commentator and framed as a basis for further review rather than as an SOS‑issued admission ^[3].

3. Technical incidents the Secretary of State has acknowledged — voter‑portal data spill

The Georgia Recorder article documents a separate technical problem: a bug in a new web portal briefly exposed personal data related to voter registration cancellation functionality; that is a specific operational fault the SOS acknowledged publicly, but it relates to data handling on a web portal rather than ballot‑handling on election day ^[2]. The Recorder’s reporting does not connect that incident to a catalog of ballot‑processing errors in tabulation or chain‑of‑custody handling ^[2].

4. What the Justice Department / election‑denial litigation items in the sample say (context, not error list)

Other items in the results delve into disputes and demands for ballots or records by outside parties — for example, reporting that supporters of election‑fraud theories sought access to ballots or unredacted voter rolls and that the Justice Department has sought VRLs from many states ^[8]. Those items provide context about contentious records requests and legal pressure around ballots, but do not substitute for an SOS inventory of ballot‑handling errors ^[8].

5. How to interpret “ballot‑handling errors” vs. reporting and audits in these sources

Within the provided material, “errors” appear in different registers: vendor/log analyses alleging scanner anomalies (the Grady SLOG claim), administrative acknowledgments of technical bugs in voter portals, and general references to audits and ballot image libraries maintained by the SOS ^{[3] [2] [4]}. The sources do not contain a single SOS report that lists specific chain‑of‑custody or poll‑worker mistakes statewide; available sources do not mention a consolidated SOS list of ballot‑handling errors ^{[1] [4]}.

6. Competing viewpoints and limits of the available reporting

The Grady County SLOG analysis argues the error rate is “172,543 times too high” relative to a cited federal benchmark and calls for equipment decertification; that is an advocacy position urging reform ^[3]. By contrast, the Secretary of State’s own materials emphasize audits, testing, and statutory procedures for ballot handling and do not adopt the Grady report’s conclusions in the provided set ^{[4] [7]}. The provided sources do not include a source in which the SOS confirms or rebuts the SLOG analysis point‑by‑point; therefore, we cannot say the SOS validated or rejected those specific claimed errors — available sources do not mention such confirmation ^{[3] [1]}.

7. What a reader should do next to get the specific list you asked for

To obtain a definitive, SOS‑issued inventory of ballot‑handling errors you should: (a) request any formal investigations or after‑action reports from the Georgia Secretary of State’s Elections Division or the State Election Board ^{[4] [7]}; (b) ask counties for incident reports or chain‑of‑custody logs; and (c) review technical SLOG and vendor reports (like the Grady analysis) while noting those are independent analyses and not SOS final determinations ^{[3] [4]}. The reporting in the provided set offers leads but does not itself contain a published SOS list of specific ballot‑handling errors ^{[1] [2]}.