How do 287(g) agreements between ICE and local or tribal law enforcement work and where are they in effect?
Executive summary
Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes the Department of Homeland Security to delegate certain federal immigration enforcement functions to trained state, local, and tribal officers through written memoranda of agreement (MOAs), which exist in different models with varying powers and oversight [1][2]. Since 2025 federal policy shifts and aggressive outreach by ICE have dramatically expanded the number and scope of these agreements, provoking debate over public-safety benefits, civil‑rights harms, and local fiscal costs [3][4][5].
1. What the law actually authorizes and the different program models
The statutory hook—INA §287(g)—permits DHS/ICE to deputize selected state or local officers to perform specified immigration functions under federal supervision, typically via MOAs that spell out duties, limits, and supervision [1][2]; those MOAs most commonly take one of at least two forms: the Jail Enforcement Model (JEM), which authorizes immigration screening and enforcement in jails, and the Warrant Service Officer (WSO) model, which limits officers to serving administrative immigration warrants and has fewer delegated powers [1][6]. ICE and advocates also describe a Task Force Model or “TFM” (sometimes called task‑force or field enforcement models) that gives broader authority to make arrests outside jails, a configuration critics call a “force multiplier” because it extends enforcement into routine policing [1][7].
2. How agreements are created, what training and oversight exist
Local agencies begin by submitting a letter of interest and negotiating an MOA with ICE; ICE provides training and certification for designated officers and says those officers operate under ICE direction and oversight, though critics contend training is limited and supervision uneven [8][3][2]. ICE’s public guidance lays out procedures for entering agreements and describes program oversight, while watchdog groups and civil‑rights litigants point to DOJ findings and past terminations where oversight failed to prevent racial profiling or civil‑rights violations [3][5][6].
3. Where 287(g) is in effect today and the scale of the program
ICE reports a rapid expansion: as of January 21, 2026, ICE said it had signed 1,317 MOAs covering agencies in 40 states, including hundreds under different models (JEM, WSO, TFM) and hundreds more signed in 2025 alone; DHS and ICE communications in 2025–2026 framed this as a dramatic increase from earlier lows [3][4][9]. Advocates and local trackers corroborate that agreements are concentrated in states like Florida, Georgia, Texas and have grown in many counties and tribal jurisdictions, while some states such as California, Oregon, Washington, Illinois, New Jersey, and Colorado have laws or policies restricting local participation [10][2].
4. Fiscal and public‑safety claims versus evidence
Proponents argue 287(g) helps remove dangerous criminals by giving ICE local reach, but studies and county experiences underscore substantial costs and little evidence of crime‑reduction: Brookings and other analyses found multi‑million dollar local implementation costs and no clear effect on crime rates in some surveyed counties, and some jurisdictions that terminated agreements cited budgetary and public‑safety tradeoffs [6][5]. ICE and DHS emphasize partnership and reimbursement opportunities, but watchdogs warn reimbursements and mandates can coerce poorer jurisdictions into participation [4][3].
5. Civil‑rights, community trust, and political context
Civil‑rights organizations document patterns of racial profiling, chilled cooperation with police, and family separations tied to 287(g) operations, and DOJ has previously found abuses in some locales—claims that frame the program as undermining public safety by eroding trust between immigrant communities and law enforcement [5][6][11]. Conversely, ICE and supportive local officials frame expansion as a federal tool to “remove the worst of the worst,” a politically salient argument that has driven executive directives and state-level encouragement of MOAs [4][3].
6. What reporting does not settle and where to look next
Available sources document statutory authority, program models, ICE counts of MOAs, studies of costs, and civil‑rights complaints, but gaps remain about granular outcomes in every jurisdiction—local impact studies, independent audits of oversight effectiveness, and up‑to‑date maps of active MOAs require consulting ICE’s 287(g) page and advocacy trackers for current lists [12][8][2]. Readers should weigh ICE and DHS statements about scale and reimbursement against independent evaluations from Brookings, ACLU chapters, ILRC, and local budget reports to form a full picture [6][5][2].