How did Judge Bruce Schroeder explain his dismissal of the under‑18 weapons charge in the Rittenhouse trial?
Executive summary
Judge Bruce Schroeder dismissed the misdemeanor count charging Kyle Rittenhouse with possession of a dangerous weapon by a person under 18 because he accepted a statutory reading that the prohibition applies only to minors who possess short‑barreled rifles or shotguns — and prosecutors conceded Rittenhouse’s AR‑style rifle did not meet that short‑barrel definition [1] [2]. Schroeder framed the problem as a matter of statutory ambiguity and technical drafting in Wisconsin law, saying the confusing text compelled him to rule in favor of the defendant [3] [1].
1. Schroeder’s legal reasoning: a textual exception tied to barrel length
Schroeder’s dismissal turned on a specific subsection of Wisconsin’s weapons statute that, when read as the defense urged, limits the under‑18 prohibition to minors “who possess or are armed with a rifle or a shotgun if the person is in violation of s. 941.28,” a cross‑reference that criminalizes short‑barreled rifles and shotguns — meaning the misdemeanor would only apply if the firearm qualified as short‑barreled, which Rittenhouse’s rifle did not [1] [4] [5]. Prosecutors conceded in court that the rifle’s barrel exceeded the statutory short‑barrel threshold (16 inches for rifles under state law), and Schroeder relied on that concession to grant the defense motion and dismiss the count just before closing arguments [1] [4] [6].
2. Ambiguity, drafting errors and judicial duty to favor defendants
Both defense and multiple commentators pointed to the statute’s tangled cross‑references and historic amendments — including a 1991 provision tied to hunting and gang‑violence era reforms — and characterized the language as “poorly worded” or confusing, a condition Schroeder invoked in explaining his ruling and which, under legal doctrine, counsels judges to interpret ambiguous criminal statutes in the defendant’s favor [5] [1] [7]. Schroeder himself signaled the law’s opacity in court and outside observers cited the textual messiness as the core reason he felt bound to dismiss rather than send the question to a jury [3] [1].
3. Prosecutors’ counterargument and why it failed in court
Assistant District Attorney James Kraus warned that reading the law to exempt nearly all rifles and shotguns unless short‑barreled would “swallow” the statute and negate the legislature’s prohibition on minors possessing dangerous weapons; nonetheless, after Kraus acknowledged the rifle did not meet the short‑barrel definition, Schroeder concluded the prosecution had the “big problem” in the statutory text and dismissed the count [5] [2]. While prosecutors retained the option to seek appellate intervention to halt proceedings pending a higher court decision, there was no immediate indication they would do so at the time Schroeder ruled [2].
4. Critics, defenders and the broader legal fallout
Critics argued Schroeder’s ruling removed what had seemed an “easy” misdemeanor conviction from the jury’s consideration and reinforced perceptions the judge favored the defense, while supporters said he was simply applying neutral principles of statutory interpretation to a badly drafted law [5] [8] [3]. The dismissal reignited debate among lawmakers and commentators about whether Wisconsin’s open‑carry and juvenile weapons statutes need legislative clarification to prevent similar outcomes in future cases [7] [9].
5. Procedural timing and practical effect on the trial
The ruling came hours before closing arguments and jury deliberations, meaning jurors never considered the under‑18 weapons count as a lesser option, and Schroeder proceeded to give extensive self‑defense instructions that framed the remaining charges [6] [10]. The immediate practical effect was to narrow the legal pathways available to the prosecution at trial, even as the statutory question that prompted the dismissal remained one that commentators and some lawmakers said should be resolved through legislative fix or appellate clarification rather than courtroom improvisation [7] [5].