How do state and local law enforcement roles interact with ICE during arrests?
Executive summary
State and local officers do not generally possess independent authority to enforce federal civil immigration law, but they interact with ICE through statutory delegations, formal agreements like 287(g), information-sharing and ad hoc collaboration—arrangements that shape who gets arrested and where [1]. That interaction is contested: some states and localities contract in and deputize officers to act as immigration agents, while others bar cooperation or limit access to jails and courthouses, producing widely divergent arrest patterns and legal fights [1] [2] [3].
1. The legal baseline: federal primacy and local limits
Federal law vests immigration enforcement authority primarily in DHS and its sub-agencies, and courts have long recognized that state and local police have only limited power to arrest or detain people for civil immigration violations unless working with federal authorities or under specific delegation . ICE officers may execute administrative warrants and make arrests under INA authorities, but municipal officers cannot unilaterally convert routine policing into civil immigration enforcement without risking conflict with state law or constitutional constraints .
2. Delegation on paper: Section 287(g) and models of cooperation
Congress created a statutory mechanism—Section 287(g)—that authorizes ICE to delegate certain immigration functions to state and local officers who receive federal training and operate under ICE supervision, and ICE now runs several models, including jail enforcement, warrant service officer (WSO) and task force approaches [1] [4]. Under the WSO and jail models, deputized officers can execute ICE administrative warrants and interrogate detainees in jails; the task force model expands authority further by embedding local officers in mixed teams and allowing routine policing to trigger immigration arrests [1] [4] [5].
3. How routine policing becomes immigration enforcement in practice
In jurisdictions participating in 287(g) task force or similar arrangements, everyday police contacts—traffic stops, arrests on state charges, workplace inspections—can lead to immigration inquiries, detainers, and transfers to ICE custody, effectively turning local enforcement into a pipeline for federal removals [5] [6]. Prison Policy Institute and reporting show states that mandate or encourage local collaboration often see higher volumes of ICE arrests and deportations, while states that restrict cooperation see fewer interior arrests [2].
4. Detainers, jails, and the jurisdictional chokepoint
A major point of interaction is the jail: local custody creates an opportunity for ICE to identify and issue detainers or administrative warrants so agents can take custody when someone would otherwise be released, and 287(g) jail models expressly authorize local staff to carry out those immigration functions [4] [1]. That same dynamic has produced litigation and state-level pushback—courts in several states and state policies have limited compliance with detainers, and some states now prohibit assistance with civil immigration arrests in sensitive locations such as courthouses [7] [3].
5. Joint operations, surges and contested narratives
Beyond formal MOAs, ICE also conducts joint operations and deploys surge forces—deployments described by ICE and reported by outlets in recent Minnesota and Phoenix operations—often coordinating with or operating alongside local agencies, though the degree of local involvement varies and has been disputed in high-profile incidents [8] [9] [10]. Those operations can create conflicting accounts about tactics and responsibility, as shown in reporting on a fatal Minneapolis shooting where federal and local narratives diverged and local prosecutors sought a role in the investigation [8] [11].
6. Politics, public trust and the accountability gap
Choices by state and local leaders—whether to sign 287(g) MOAs, limit ICE access to databases and facilities, or adopt sanctuary policies—translate into concrete differences in enforcement on the ground and shape community trust in policing [2] [6]. At the same time, when federal agents operate in local spaces without clear cooperation, questions of accountability arise: states are pushing statutory and policy shields for courts and courthouses, local prosecutors are asserting authority to investigate federal misconduct, and advocates warn of racial profiling and erosion of community trust tied to expanded local-federal enforcement networks [3] [7] [6].