Has ICE disclosed its AI procurement records or an AI inventory similar to the DOJ’s?

1. How the question should be read: disclosure versus discovery

The user’s question asks whether ICE proactively disclosed a catalog of its AI tools and contracts in the way the DOJ has (i.e., an agency-authored inventory), not whether contracts exist or have been discovered by outsiders; the distinction matters because the sources show disclosure-by-journalism and procurement filings rather than a formal ICE-published inventory ^{[1] [2]}.

2. What public reporting has actually revealed about ICE’s AI and surveillance buys

Numerous journalists and watchdogs have pieced together a dense trail of ICE contracts and requests showing purchases and interest in facial recognition, social‑media monitoring, “AI agents” for locating people, ad‑tech-derived identity services, and other automated tools—examples reported include contracts and RFIs for social media surveillance, Clearview AI facial‑recognition deals, and purchases described as “bounty hunter AI agents” and skip‑tracing services ^{[1] [4] [2] [5]}.

3. How those discoveries were made (and what that implies about formal disclosure)

Reporting relied on procurement databases, Freedom of Information Act reporting by outlets such as WIRED and 404 Media, contract-tracking projects, and public RFIs; these are instances of third parties assembling an inventory from scattered records rather than ICE publishing a single, agency‑maintained AI inventory or transparency portal ^{[1] [2] [3]}.

4. ICE’s public posture when questioned about its tech buys

When journalists asked, ICE framed its use of technology as standard investigative practice and asserted that it respects civil liberties and privacy, but that statement was reactive to reporting rather than evidence of a proactive disclosure program that catalogs AI systems and capabilities for public review ^[1].

5. Signs of active procurement and market research that are not the same as disclosure

ICE has issued requests for information and market research into ad‑tech and big data capabilities and set deadlines for vendor responses, signaling active expansion of automated and AI-enabled surveillance capabilities—but RFIs and contracts are not the same as an agency-authored, explanatory inventory describing systems, use‑cases, risk assessments, and governance measures ^{[3] [6]}.

6. Independent trackers and civil‑society reactions fill the transparency gap

Advocacy groups, investigative outlets and policy trackers (for example, Electronic Frontier Foundation and Immigration Policy Tracking Project) have compiled contract totals and described specific deals—some reporting cites multi‑million‑dollar Clearview contracts and expansive commercial data integrations—yet these third‑party reconstructions underscore that the agency itself has not offered the consolidated transparency some civil‑liberty advocates demand ^{[7] [4] [8]}.

7. Limits of the available reporting and what cannot be asserted

None of the supplied sources document a formal ICE-published AI inventory modeled on the DOJ’s public disclosures, and the documents cited are primarily contracts, RFIs, press reports and advocacy analyses; if DOJ did maintain a specific kind of inventory and the user expects a direct parity comparison, the provided reporting does not include DOJ’s inventory details, so this analysis cannot definitively map parity features or procedures ^{[1] [3]}.

8. Bottom line assessment

Based on the published procurement records, RFIs, investigative articles and advocacy reports reviewed, ICE has not voluntarily released a single, public AI procurement inventory analogous to the DOJ’s; instead, ICE’s AI-related buys and experiments have been reconstructed by journalists and watchdogs from contract filings and agency solicitations while ICE issues reactive statements defending its practices ^{[1] [2] [3]}.