What policies govern ICE use of deadly force and have they changed since 2017?
Executive summary
Federal constitutional law, federal statutes and regulations, and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) use-of-force guidance together govern when Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers may employ deadly force; the controlling legal standard is an “objectively reasonable” belief that a subject poses an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury [1] [2]. DHS and ICE directives reiterate that deadly force is tightly limited — including explicit prohibitions and narrow exceptions for firing at moving vehicles — and those agency rules have been clarified in policy memos and handbooks issued after 2017 but rest on longstanding Fourth Amendment and federal regulatory frameworks [3] [4] [5].
1. Legal and constitutional framework that sets the ceiling
ICE use-of-force authority is constrained by the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” standard as interpreted in Supreme Court precedent, which limits deadly force to situations where an officer reasonably believes there is an imminent risk of death or serious bodily harm to the officer or others; commentators and legal experts point to that constitutional baseline repeatedly in coverage of ICE shootings [1] [2] [6].
2. DHS and ICE policy layers: what the written rules say
DHS publishes a Department Policy on the Use of Force that instructs officers deadly force “may” be used only when necessary and when there is a reasonable belief of an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury, and ICE supplements that with its own Firearms and Use of Force Directive and handbook that define “deadly force,” required reporting, and the agency’s internal review procedures [3] [5] [4].
3. The specific rule on shooting at moving vehicles
DHS and ICE guidance make shooting at the operator of a moving vehicle generally prohibited except in narrow circumstances — when someone in the vehicle is using or imminently threatening deadly force by means other than the vehicle, or when the vehicle itself poses an immediate deadly threat and no reasonable defensive option exists — and both DHS and Department of Justice guidance stress officers should avoid firing solely to disable a vehicle or to prevent escape [4] [7] [8].
4. Statutory and regulatory designations, training, and minimum-force mandates
Federal regulation (8 C.F.R. §287.8) authorizes designated immigration officers to use non‑deadly and, when so designated, deadly force, but requires use of the minimum non-deadly force necessary and escalation only when warranted by the subject’s actions and capabilities; ICE’s internal handbook and directives operationalize those requirements into training, reporting, and critical-incident review processes [9] [10] [5].
5. What changed since 2017 — policies, enforcement posture and litigation context
Since 2017 the federal enforcement posture toward immigration has expanded, and DHS and ICE have updated and re-emphasized use‑of‑force guidance — including a 2018 DHS memo and a 2023 policy restating limits on deadly force and clarifying vehicle-shooting scenarios — but the core constitutional standard remained consistent and many critiques focus on application and training rather than entirely new legal rules [1] [4] [7]. Court activity also affected practice: injunctions and litigation had imposed operational limits (body cameras, identification, use of certain chemical agents) in places like Chicago, but recent developments have removed or weakened some litigation constraints even as oversight debates continue [11].
6. Why controversies persist and where reporting is thin
Debates persist because federal directives can be vague about tactical choices (for example, whether agents should “move out of the path” of a vehicle when feasible), because federal-level guidance has historically lagged some local reforms, and because investigations of deadly encounters hinge on split-second perceptions that media, advocates and officials interpret differently; available reporting documents the written rules and recent memos but cannot substitute for full investigative findings in individual cases, and it does not uniformly show how training and discipline changed across ICE since 2017 [12] [6] [2].