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Fact check: How does ICE cooperate with local law enforcement to deport undocumented immigrants with criminal records?
Executive Summary
Local cooperation between U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and municipal law enforcement is being expanded through two primary mechanisms: the federal 287(g) deputization agreements that train and authorize local officers to carry out immigration enforcement, and the addition of hundreds of thousands of immigration arrest warrants to a national database that makes “wanted” status more visible to local police. Supporters say these changes speed removal of noncitizens with criminal records, while critics warn they risk racial profiling, erode community trust, and shift costs onto local agencies [1] [2] [3].
1. How Deputization Turns Local Cops into Federal Immigration Agents
The most explicit channel for cooperation is the 287(g) program, under which the Department of Homeland Security formalizes partnerships with sheriff’s offices and police departments, trains deputies, and grants limited federal authority to enforce immigration laws. The DHS reported in September 2025 that 287(g) surpassed 1,000 partnerships, framing the program as focused on removing “the worst of the worst” criminal aliens, signaling a federal priority to embed immigration enforcement locally [1]. Local agencies that join say the program streamlines detention and transfer to ICE custody, but the program’s expansion also reflects federal incentives to offload enforcement to local partners [1] [3].
2. Databases and Warrants: How Local Officers Learn Who ICE Wants
A separate but complementary tool is informational: the federal government added hundreds of thousands of immigration arrest warrants to a national law-enforcement database, increasing the likelihood that an officer conducting routine checks will learn a person is wanted by ICE. Journalistic reporting in January 2026 described how greater data visibility makes cooperation more opportunistic, enabling arrests during community policing contacts or jail booking processes without a separate ICE presence at the scene [2]. This data-driven approach reduces coordination costs for ICE but raises civil-liberty questions about how and when status flags are acted upon.
3. Local Implementation: New Hampshire as a Case Study of Rapid Uptake
Multiple New Hampshire counties—Grafton, Belknap and others—have recently joined or begun participating in 287(g) training and immigration-check collaborations, illustrating how federal programs translate into local policy changes. Local officials argue these partnerships allow deputies to identify and detain people suspected of immigration violations and transfer them to ICE-approved detention centers, presenting the change as operationally straightforward [3] [4]. However, reporting on these same local rollouts documents public concern about racial profiling, diminished community cooperation with police, and potential budgetary impacts for counties absorbing enforcement duties [3].
4. Conflicting Frames: Public Safety Versus Community Trust
Proponents—federal DHS messaging and participating sheriffs—frame expansion as a public-safety measure targeting criminal offenders and facilitating removals. DHS’s September 2025 release emphasized removing dangerous noncitizens through 287(g) partnerships [1]. Critics, including community advocates and journalists covering New Hampshire, counter that immigration enforcement by local police can chill reporting of crimes and increase racial profiling, undermining policing outcomes and public health priorities. These divergent framings point to an underlying trade-off between enforcement metrics and community-based policing goals [3] [4].
5. Financial, Legal and Operational Costs Baked into Local Cooperation
Local adoption is not costless. Training, record-sharing systems, transportation to ICE detention centers, and potential legal liabilities for civil-rights violations impose fiscal and administrative burdens on counties and municipalities. Coverage from March–November 2025 raised these concerns while documenting local agency arguments that program participation streamlines removals despite added expenses, revealing a political and budgetary calculus that varies across jurisdictions [3]. The tension between federal rhetoric of partnership and local budget realities shapes how sustainably these programs expand.
6. Evidence Gaps and Accountability Questions That Matter
Reporting shows the mechanics of cooperation—training, database flags, transfers—clearly enable more deportations of noncitizens with criminal records, but empirical questions remain about outcomes and harms. Journalistic and policy analyses highlight limited publicly available data on wrongful detentions, racial disparities in stops, and the net public-safety benefits versus community costs, creating an accountability gap as programs scale [2]. The lack of comprehensive, independent evaluations makes it difficult to weigh the programs’ law-enforcement gains against civil-rights and trust damages.
7. Bottom Line: A Patchwork System with Competing Incentives
Taken together, the sources show a two-tiered strategy—legal authority via 287(g) and informational pressure via warrant databases—driving increased cooperation between ICE and local law enforcement. Supporters portray this as efficient removal of dangerous noncitizens; critics emphasize the actual implementation produces trade-offs in civil liberties, policing trust, and local costs, and call for clearer data and oversight. The recent New Hampshire examples and DHS reporting through late 2025–early 2026 provide a concrete snapshot of how cooperation is expanding while important accountability and impact questions remain unresolved [1] [2] [3].