What do independent researchers say about the role of federal agents versus National Guard troops in U.S. cities’ crime trends?

1. The national picture: falling crime that predates deployments

Multiple independent datasets and think‑tank analyses show violent crime and homicides were already trending downward through 2024 and into 2025, with some researchers calling 2025’s drop historic and across many cities—findings that make it difficult to attribute declines to deployments that began only later or in a handful of places ^{[1] [4] [5]}.

2. What crime analysts say about federal agents’ impact: limited and hard to isolate

Crime analysts interviewed by Reuters and other outlets emphasize that when agencies report declines after federal deployments, causation is unclear because the same downward trajectory existed before the interventions and because federal agents’ work (investigations, prosecutions, raids) is episodic and not designed to substitute for everyday policing; Jeff Asher and others argue the data do not support simple causal claims linking federal action to national drops ^{[2] [3]}.

3. The National Guard: deterrent visibility, constrained authority

Independent observers note the Guard’s visible presence can deter certain crimes in the short term when troop numbers markedly increase local uniformed presence, but Guardsmen are generally barred by law from performing traditional police functions—limiting long‑term crime‑control mechanisms—so measured declines while troops are present may reflect deterrence, displacement, or coincident trends rather than sustainable policing outcomes ^{[6] [2]}.

4. Comparative evidence: cities with no deployments show similar declines

Analyses from the Council on Criminal Justice and other independent researchers find broad declines across many cities, including places that did not receive federal agents or Guard troops, suggesting broader forces at work; one report highlighted that cities without surges of federal personnel experienced similar historic drops in violent crime as those with deployments, challenging the claim that federal presence is the decisive factor ^{[7] [1]}.

5. Alternative explanations researchers emphasize: national, local and policy factors

Criminologists advance several competing mechanisms supported by data: longer‑term national trends back toward pre‑pandemic levels, shifts in policing tactics and trust between police and communities (crime tips rising in some cities), improvements in prosecutions and court functioning, and social‑economic and cultural forces—each of which can explain sizable parts of the decline independent researchers say are more plausible drivers than transient federal deployments ^{[8] [9] [1]}.

6. Measurement problems, short windows and political framing

Independent researchers warn that short measurement windows, differences in data collection, and political narratives complicate interpretation: rapid declines reported through mid‑year or select city dashboards can overstate or misattribute effects, while federal actors may emphasize deployments for political ends; the Trace and Stateline analyses stress that deployments have not consistently targeted the highest‑crime places and that claims of "taking over" policing ignore legal limits and data caveats ^{[3] [10]}.

7. Costs, rights and long‑term consequences highlighted by experts

Beyond doubtful impact on long‑term crime trends, public‑policy researchers caution about collateral harms: civil‑liberties abuses and wrongful arrests have already been documented in federal operations, and organizations such as the Vera Institute argue that militarized or temporary troop presences can undermine trust and impede community‑based violence reduction strategies that researchers find more effective over time ^{[11] [3]}.

8. Bottom line: modest, situational effects amid stronger broader drivers

Independent researchers summarize the evidence as indicating that federal agents and National Guard troops may produce situational or short‑term effects—largely through increased visible deterrence or targeted operations—but they are neither necessary nor sufficient explanations for the sweeping, multi‑city declines seen in 2024–2025; the preponderance of expert analysis points to broader national trends, local policing changes, and non‑enforcement interventions as the more reliable explanations, while cautioning about legal limits and long‑run costs of militarized responses ^{[1] [7] [6]}.