What international cooperation exists to combat Venezuelan drug trafficking at sea?
Executive summary
International cooperation to combat Venezuelan maritime drug trafficking is fragmented: formal multilateral frameworks like UNTOC oblige states to cooperate, while on-the-water efforts range from bilateral law-enforcement partnerships (France–Venezuela seizures noted) to a U.S. military-led campaign in the Caribbean that has involved strikes on suspected drug vessels (U.S. officials say 19 strikes and 15,000 troops; France has focused on law enforcement) [1] [2] [3]. Reporting and analysts disagree about Venezuela’s role as a source vs. transit state and about the legality and efficacy of recent U.S. military actions [1] [2] [4].
1. International law and formal obligations: treaties that require cooperation
The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and similar transnational-crime frameworks create legal obligations for states to cooperate on drug trafficking, money laundering, and related cross-border crimes; commentators argue these frameworks shape demands on Venezuela as a transit state even if it is not a primary producer [1]. Historical bilateral instruments exist as well — a 2004 U.S.–Venezuela treaty and past memoranda on maritime counterdrug cooperation illustrate institutional pathways for cooperation even when political relations are strained [5] [6].
2. Bilateral and regional law-enforcement cooperation: examples and limits
There are concrete instances of successful law-enforcement cooperation: France and Venezuela have worked together on seizures en route to French territories, and Venezuelan and French authorities jointly intercepted multiple vessels between 2022–2024, showing law-enforcement exchange remains possible [2]. Yet long-standing problems — porous borders, weak judicial systems, and “sporadic” counternarcotics cooperation — limit consistent bilateral action, as U.S. State Department reporting and older INCSR analyses document [6] [5].
3. U.S. strategy: deterrence, strikes, and an expanded military footprint
Since mid-2025 the U.S. has emphasized deterrence and kinetic measures in the Caribbean under operations described publicly as counter‑drug campaigns (Operation Southern Spear). U.S. officials reported assembling a large naval and troop presence and conducting repeated strikes on suspected drug boats (reported numbers include roughly a dozen warships, 15,000 troops, and nearly 19 strikes with dozens killed), reflecting a shift from purely law‑enforcement tools toward military means [3] [2] [4]. Critics and regional bodies have raised legal, humanitarian, and geopolitical concerns about such strikes [4] [7].
4. Regional responses and political frictions shape cooperation
Regional organizations and governments have reacted unevenly: CARICOM urged cooperative responses rather than unilateral militarized action, while leaders of major Latin American democracies have expressed opposition to the U.S. approach, complicating a unified regional counternarcotics posture [7]. Changes in intelligence-sharing relationships — for example, disputes over Colombian cooperation with the United States — also affect interdiction capacity, given that much U.S. Caribbean intelligence has historically come from regional partners [8].
5. Disagreement about scale, sources, and policy consequences
Analysts and official reports diverge on how much cocaine or synthetic drugs transit Venezuela. U.S. estimates cited in reporting place substantial volumes through Venezuelan routes (historical U.S. estimates of 200–250 metric tons annually cited), while UNODC and some analysts emphasize Andean origins and question Venezuela’s centrality as a producer; that debate matters because it influences whether partners favor law enforcement, diplomatic pressure, sanctions, or military interdiction [1] [9]. The designation of Venezuelan-linked groups as terrorist organizations by U.S. policy adds another contested element to cooperation incentives and legal tools [10].
6. Practical cooperation on the water: what exists and what’s fragile
Practical maritime cooperation ranges from joint investigations and intelligence-sharing to on-the-water interdictions and vessel boardings under preexisting maritime agreements; however, such cooperation is fragile — political hostility, sanctions, and claims of state complicity undermine consistent joint operations and mutual legal assistance [6] [5]. Where cooperation has worked (e.g., French seizures linked to Venezuelan-origin routes), it depended on pragmatic law‑enforcement ties rather than high-level political alignment [2].
7. Open questions and reporting gaps
Available sources do not mention comprehensive multilateral naval coalitions operating under a unified legal mandate in Venezuelan waters; reporting focuses on U.S. military operations, selective bilateral law-enforcement cases (France), and treaty/legal frameworks that require cooperation [3] [2] [1]. Sources also disagree on the magnitude of trafficking through Venezuela and whether kinetic U.S. measures are lawful or effective—points that should be central to any policy evaluation [9] [4].
Conclusion: International cooperation exists on several levels — legal frameworks, episodic bilateral law‑enforcement actions, and robust (and controversial) U.S. military efforts in the Caribbean — but political tensions, divergent assessments of Venezuela’s role, and concern about legality and civilian harm have fractured a unified, sustained international maritime strategy [1] [2] [3].