How do international laws (e.g., Nuremberg principles, Geneva Conventions) affect obligations to obey orders?

1. Nuremberg’s message: personal responsibility, not automatic exoneration

The Nuremberg judgments and the Nuremberg Principles rejected obedience as an automatic defense: defendants who claimed they were “just following orders” were held personally responsible when the illegality was clear — a standard later summarized as the Nuremberg Principle that superior orders do not relieve one of responsibility for crimes such as genocide or crimes against humanity ^{[1] [5]}. Educational and legal analyses of those trials stress the tribunals’ insistence that when an order is manifestly unlawful (for example ordering the murder of civilians) the subordinate must be held accountable for compliance ^{[6] [7]}.

2. Modern criminal law: limited defense under the Rome Statute and doctrine

Contemporary instruments, including interpretations of the Rome Statute, allow a narrow superior‑orders defense in limited circumstances — for example where the person was legally bound to obey, did not know the order was unlawful, and the order was not manifestly unlawful — but the protection is deliberately constrained and debated by scholars and courts ^{[1] [8]}. Academic commentary notes that Article 33 of the Rome Statute may permit mitigation in minor cases but does not nullify Nuremberg’s core prohibition against using orders to justify grave breaches ^{[9] [10]}.

3. Geneva Conventions: state duties and individual implications

The Geneva Conventions form the core of international humanitarian law (IHL) and bind state parties to protect civilians, prisoners and the wounded; they also create duties to search for, prosecute or extradite persons suspected of grave breaches, which means unlawful orders implicating grave breaches can attract criminal responsibility that states must address ^{[3] [4]}. The International Committee of the Red Cross emphasizes that IHL is universal: all parties, state or non‑state, must respect its rules, making “obeying orders” no escape where conduct violates the Conventions ^{[11] [12]}.

4. Duty to disobey: treaties and doctrine encouraging refusal of illegal orders

Beyond Nuremberg, later instruments and commentaries push the converse obligation: persons and states have both the right and, in some formulations, the duty to refuse manifestly illegal orders (e.g., prohibitions in Additional Protocol I and regional instruments discussed in doctrinal sources), and military manuals increasingly integrate legal‑ethical training so soldiers can identify and resist illegal commands ^{[13] [7]}. Scholarly work argues that militaries must teach soldiers to “test” orders against higher law, because discipline cannot justify committing atrocities ^{[7] [14]}.

5. Practical limits and contested questions in enforcement

Enforcing this legal framework faces practical obstacles: determining when an order is “manifestly unlawful” can be contested, proving knowledge or coercion is fact‑specific, and states sometimes resist broad constraints on military discipline — historically leading to variation in how tribunals and national courts assess the superior‑orders issue ^{[9] [2]}. Commentators note that states have sometimes provided mitigation or resisted strict readings because of concerns about military cohesion, producing uneven accountability over time ^{[9] [10]}.

6. State obligations under Common Article 1 and universal jurisdiction

Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions imposes an obligation on states not only to respect IHL but to “ensure respect” by their armed forces and others; coupled with universal jurisdiction duties for grave breaches, this creates institutional pressure to investigate and punish unlawful orders and those who carry them out ^{[15] [4]}. The ICRC and other experts stress states must have systems in place — training, investigation and prosecution — so that obedience to illegal orders cannot be an effective shield ^{[11] [16]}.

7. Takeaway for practitioners and citizens: training, legal advice, and documentation

Given international law’s stance, military personnel and officials should seek legal advice when confronted with orders they suspect are unlawful, document orders and contexts, and use internal reporting channels; states must provide IHL training and mechanisms for lawful refusal, because international law ties individual responsibility to broader state obligations to prevent and punish grave violations ^{[7] [17]}. When sources disagree — e.g., tension between military discipline and refusal doctrines — authoritative practice tends to favor accountability for manifestly unlawful acts while acknowledging enforcement challenges ^{[9] [15]}.

Limitations: available sources discuss doctrine, treaties and jurisprudence but do not provide a single checklist to resolve every real‑world case; application depends on facts, national law and tribunal practice (not found in current reporting).