What is the latest on Kotvitski dollar smuggling?

1. Missing subject: no source names or events called "Kotvitski"

The documents provided do not contain any mention of an individual, group or case called "Kotvitski" or a headline explicitly about "Kotvitski dollar smuggling," and therefore no direct factual update can be reported about that name from these sources; this absence is decisive for the narrow user question and requires relying on adjacent reporting about dollar movement and enforcement instead ^[1][2].

2. What the sources do show about large-scale attempts to move cash across borders

Customs authorities and domestic agencies have reported numerous and sizable attempts to move hard currency: Russian customs statements said officers stopped attempts to smuggle foreign currency worth the equivalent of almost ₽2 billion and counted more than 10,900 interdictions over an 11‑month period, illustrating that cross‑border cash movement remains an active enforcement target ^[1].

3. Digital-dollar workarounds and sanctions evasion are a key modern route

U.S. Treasury reporting shows a recurrent emphasis on the use of dollar‑pegged digital assets to skirt sanctions and move dollar value—OFAC sanctioned networks tied to the TGR Group that exploited U.S. dollar‑backed stablecoins to help Russian elites evade international sanctions, signaling that "dollar smuggling" today frequently means tokenized dollars and on‑chain transfers as well as physical cash ^[2].

4. Enforcement priorities and new operations that touch dollar flows

U.S. agencies are actively deploying data‑driven operations against networks and businesses that can facilitate money movement: FinCEN announced an operation targeting more than 100 money services businesses near the southwest border to address potential cartel-related money laundering, showing U.S. enforcement is focusing on institutional chokepoints for illicit dollar flows ^[3]. Separately, international criminal agencies have exposed complex laundering networks that moved funds through purchases of financial institutions to facilitate sanctions evasion, underscoring the transnational and corporate scale of contemporary dollar concealment schemes ^[4].

5. Regional seizures and the scale of conventional contraband enforcement

National authorities continue to seize high‑value contraband—including in the Philippines, where the Bureau of Customs reported P61.707 billion worth of smuggled agricultural goods, illegal drugs and other contraband seized in 2025—demonstrating sustained capacity and political will in some jurisdictions to interdict high‑value illicit commerce that can include or finance dollar movement ^[5].

6. Competing narratives, motives and the limits of available evidence

Different actors emphasize distinct threats: Treasury and enforcement agencies foreground sanctions evasion and cartel money laundering to justify aggressive operations and digital surveillance ^[2][3], while some state actors frame foreign interdictions as overreach or piracy when seizures touch national interests (as seen in Russia’s reaction to U.S. maritime seizures), revealing how geopolitical agendas shape interpretations of interdiction activity ^[6]. The provided reporting does not link these macro trends to any specific "Kotvitski" actor, so any claim that ties that name to these trends would be speculation beyond the supplied sources ^[6].

7. Bottom line for the original question

Based on the supplied material, there is no verifiable "latest" to report about a Kotvitski dollar‑smuggling case because the name does not appear in the documents; however, the sources collectively show active global enforcement against large cash smuggling, sophisticated use of dollar‑pegged digital assets for sanctions evasion, and coordinated operations targeting money‑movement intermediaries—context that defines the modern landscape in which any dollar‑smuggling actor would operate ^[1][2][3][5].