How hard is it to launch an investigation into someone for CSAM possession without any file/image/Video/hash indication
Executive summary
Launching a CSAM possession probe without any file, image, video or known hash is difficult but routine pathways exist: investigations commonly start from platform reports, CyberTips, witness tips, financial traces, device repair discoveries or unrelated searches that then justify warrants and seizures [1] [2] [3]. Digital evidence practices and laws mean investigators usually need some indicia—IP logs, provider reports, metadata, financial or network traces—to obtain subpoenas or warrants; major policy moves aim to expand mandatory reporting and scanning but also raise privacy and technical limits [1] [4] [5].
1. How prosecutions normally begin — the practical evidence investigators use
Most CSAM prosecutions rest on identifying specific files (often via hashes) or on receiving a CyberTip from platforms, which lets law enforcement subpoena account-holder data or seek search warrants to seize devices and cloud data; because IP addresses change and data can be deleted, speed and some initial digital indicia are critical [1]. Investigations also commence when repair technicians, witnesses, or unrelated probes uncover suspected CSAM on devices, prompting forensic duplication and analysis [1] [2].
2. What “no file/hash” really means in practice
“No file/hash” often means investigators lack a known-match fingerprint (PhotoDNA or other hash) for a specific contraband image. That absence does not preclude action: providers still report suspected material identified by automated detection or moderator review, and law enforcement can use those reports (CyberTips) plus logs and account data to build probable cause for subpoenas or warrants [1]. Available sources do not mention a single universal threshold; instead, procedures rely on combinations of provider reports, metadata, and corroborating traces [1] [2].
3. Alternate investigative routes: network, financial and behavioral traces
Investigations can pivot from non-file evidence. Financial tracing and on‑chain analysis have been decisive in dismantling dark‑web CSAM networks—tracing payments and wallet behavior led to arrests and seizures even where content was hosted across jurisdictions [3]. Similarly, metadata, account logs, communications and distribution networks can supply the probable cause necessary to obtain search warrants for devices or cloud accounts [3] [1].
4. The role of platform scanning and emerging legal obligations
Legislative efforts and proposals—such as the STOP CSAM Act in the U.S. and EU regulatory proposals—are expanding demands on large providers to report and sometimes to scan for CSAM, increasing the volume of leads available to investigators [4] [5]. These policy changes increase the chance an investigation will start without an externally provided file/hash but also intensify privacy and technical debates about surveillance and encryption trade‑offs [5] [6].
5. Limits, risks and false leads in fileless inquiries
Automated detection and broad scanning risk false positives and miscontextualized flags—seminar participants warned detection tech can flag consensual or ambiguous imagery and that investigations may proceed even if charges are later dropped [7]. Public reporting, mischief, bullying or mistaken moderation can spawn investigations that turn up no contraband; sources note that many investigations end inconclusively because they began on weak tips or contextual misinterpretation [8] [7].
6. Forensics, custody and evidentiary standards once a lead exists
If investigators secure a CyberTip or other lead, they typically use grand jury subpoenas or other court process to identify account holders, then seek search warrants to seize storage for forensic imaging; forensic copies preserve integrity for prosecution or exoneration [1] [2]. Tools and vendors for cloud and device forensics emphasize safeguards and chain‑of‑custody because CSAM evidence requires special handling and legal thresholds [9] [1].
7. Competing viewpoints and policy trade‑offs
Advocates for aggressive detection stress that more mandatory reporting and scanning will uncover previously hidden abuse and facilitate prosecutions [4] [3]. Privacy and civil‑liberties voices warn ubiquitous scanning and interception risk overreach, false prosecution, and erosion of end‑to‑end encryption—EU debate and expert seminars highlight these tensions [5] [7] [6]. Sources portray a clear trade‑off between increased investigatory leads and risks to privacy and context‑sensitive judgment [5] [7].
8. Bottom line for someone asking “how hard?”
It is harder to launch a durable, prosecutable CSAM possession investigation without any file/hash than when one exists, but investigators routinely build cases from provider reports, logs, metadata, financial traces, witness tips or incidental discoveries; those alternative traces can justify subpoenas and warrants and have led to major takedowns [1] [3]. Available sources do not provide a single metric of “how hard,” but collectively show multiple practical pathways and the legal and technical limits that shape whether a fileless probe succeeds [1] [3] [7].