What legal authority allows or limits local police from participating in ICE residential raids?
Executive summary
Local police participation in ICE residential raids is governed by a mix of federal statutes that enable cooperation, state and local laws that can restrict it, and written agreements that deputize local officers—most notably 8 U.S.C. § 1357 and Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act—while judicial warrants or consent remain prerequisites for ICE entry into homes under the Fourth Amendment and DHS policy [1] [2] [3]. Courts and state attorneys general have repeatedly held that local officers cannot be compelled to carry out federal civil immigration detainers and that many municipalities have passed ordinances limiting routine participation, leaving participation largely voluntary or contract-bound except where state law says otherwise [4] [5].
1. Statutory backbone: federal authority that lets ICE act and invite local help
Federal arrest and inspection powers for immigration derive from statutes such as 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226 and 1357, which authorize immigration officers to arrest and detain aliens and perform certain enforcement functions, and Section 287(g) of the INA, which explicitly authorizes the homeland security secretary to enter into MOAs that deputize state and local officers to perform immigration functions after training and ICE supervision [1] [2] [6]. Those statutory tools give ICE the legal authority to conduct residential arrests and to create cooperative frameworks with local agencies; they do not by themselves convert every local officer into an ICE agent absent a formal agreement or state law that says otherwise [2] [6].
2. Warrant rules and consent: constitutional limits on entering homes
Independent of whether local police accompany ICE, the Fourth Amendment and DHS guidance generally require either a judicial warrant or voluntary consent to enter a private residence; ICE’s administrative “warrants” do not by themselves authorize entry without consent or a judge-signed warrant, a point emphasized in reporting and ICE training material disclosures [3] [7] [4]. This constraint means that role-sharing at the front door—who knocks, who speaks for consent, who executes a judge-signed warrant—matters legally and factually, and improper entries risk civil rights litigation [3] [7].
3. Local discretion: voluntary cooperation, municipal limits and state divergence
There is no blanket federal law forcing local police to participate in ICE raids; cooperation is generally voluntary unless state law or a local ordinance creates an obligation, and many cities and states have passed local rules that limit police involvement in routine civil immigration enforcement while allowing cooperation on criminal matters [5] [4]. State courts and attorneys general likewise influence practice: for example, Massachusetts guidance notes that local officers lack authority to arrest solely on a federal civil immigration detainer, and other jurisdictions have adopted “sanctuary” policies or ordinances that curtail routine assistance to ICE [4] [5].
4. Formal deputization: how 287(g) and MOAs change the equation
When a jurisdiction signs a 287(g) memorandum of agreement or similar MOA, designated local officers receive ICE training and may perform immigration functions under ICE supervision—an arrangement that effectively deputizes them to act in immigration enforcement and has been used by numerous agencies nationally [2] [6]. That shift can expand local involvement lawfully, but it also creates political flashpoints and has been the target of litigation and activism because it subjects local policing to federal immigration priorities [2] [6].
5. Limits, liability and political conflict: arrests of federal agents and state responses
Local and state officials have tools to push back—ranging from ordinances and attorney-general lawsuits to public statements asserting the duty to hold federal agents accountable if they commit crimes—yet the immunity federal agents typically enjoy when performing official duties complicates confrontations, leading to legal disputes about whether and when state or local police can arrest or prosecute federal officers [8] [9]. This tension exposes implicit political agendas on both sides: federal priorities to expand enforcement, and local or state priorities to protect community trust and constitutional rights [8] [10].
6. Practical effects and accountability gaps
In practice, ICE can and does conduct unannounced residential operations and sometimes pairs with local officers when permitted or deputized, and the agency’s relative youth and sparse outside oversight have been criticized as producing fewer use-of-force guardrails than for many local police forces—an accountability gap that fuels public backlash and legal scrutiny [11] [3]. Reporting and legal briefs also document tactics like “ruses” that exploit consent rules, underscoring why the precise legal basis for local participation—statutory deputization, local ordinance, or mere voluntary cooperation—matters for civil liberties and litigation risk [7] [11].