What legal criteria do countries use to declare an event a genocide under international law?

1. The written definition: acts plus “dolus specialis”

The Genocide Convention’s Article II lists five categories of prohibited acts (killing; causing serious bodily or mental harm; deliberately inflicting conditions calculated to bring about physical destruction; imposing measures to prevent births; and forcible transfer of children) — but those acts only become genocide if committed “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,” the Convention’s signature requirement commonly called dolus specialis ^{[1] [5]}. United Nations guidance and academic commentators stress that the “special intent” element is what distinguishes genocide from other atrocity crimes ^{[4] [2]}.

2. Who is protected — and who is not

International law’s protected categories are narrow: national, ethnical, racial and religious groups are explicitly covered by the Convention; political groups and so‑called “cultural genocide” are excluded from the Convention’s text ^{[1] [6]}. Scholarly sources note this limitation was the result of political compromise in the treaty negotiations and remains contested by some writers and advocates ^{[7] [2]}.

3. Intent is the legal hurdle and courts use patterns to infer it

Because prosecutors must prove the specific intent to destroy a group “in whole or in part,” courts and tribunals often infer intent from contextual evidence such as state or organizational policies, mass scale of atrocities, targeting patterns, and statements by leaders — rather than isolated acts alone ^{[4] [8]}. The British Academy and UN materials emphasize the gap between public usage of “genocide” (often for any large‑scale atrocity) and the legal standard that requires proof of intent ^{[2] [4]}.

4. Modes of liability and precursor crimes

The legal architecture treats planning, conspiring, instigating, ordering, aiding and abetting, and direct public incitement to genocide as punishable acts — in some instances even before genocidal acts occur — under instruments such as the Rome Statute and ad hoc tribunal statutes ^{[9] [5]}. The International Criminal Court uses the Convention’s definition (Article 6 of the Rome Statute aligns with the Convention), and the Rome Statute criminalizes incitement even if genocide itself has not yet been completed ^{[9] [10]}.

5. State responsibility, prevention and the ICJ’s role

The Genocide Convention obliges states not only to punish genocide but to prevent it; disputes over state compliance can be brought to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which has repeatedly described the Convention’s principles as reflecting customary international law binding on all states whether they ratified the treaty or not ^{[11] [4]}. Recent interstate litigation shows the Convention’s political as well as legal functions: states can sue other states at the ICJ alleging failure to prevent or punish genocidal acts ^{[3] [12]}.

6. Practical and political challenges in making a determination

Scholars and practitioners point out enduring controversies: the high evidentiary bar to prove dolus specialis; the Convention’s limited protected categories; and states’ reluctance to accept genocide labels because of legal obligations and political consequences ^{[7] [2]}. The UN, courts and tribunals have applied the definition unevenly over time, and major cases (e.g., Rwanda, Srebrenica, and recent ICJ filings) illustrate both the legal tests and the political drama that accompanies genocide allegations ^{[13] [8]}.

7. What sources do not settle

Available sources do not mention any additional or alternative legal criteria outside the Convention/Rome Statute framework that would expand protected groups (for example, to include political groups) or change the dolus specialis requirement; they also do not provide a single checklist that removes judicial interpretation from the process (not found in current reporting) ^{[1] [10]}.

Conclusion: The international legal determination of genocide is a two‑part test entrenched in the 1948 Genocide Convention and mirrored in the Rome Statute: a listed act plus an intent to destroy a protected group. Courts and international bodies rely on patterns of conduct, state or organizational policies, and contextual evidence to infer intent; political and evidentiary constraints make legal findings of genocide rare and contested ^{[1] [4] [2]}.