What legal reasoning did the Court use to limit or reject presidential immunity?

1. The Court’s legal architecture: three tiers of immunity

The majority opinion built a three-tiered test: ^[3] absolute immunity for acts performed within the President’s exclusive constitutional authority (the “core” or “exclusive sphere”); ^[4] presumptive immunity for other official acts that fall within the outer perimeter of responsibility; and ^[5] no immunity for unofficial acts. That structure is the central legal reasoning the Court used to limit a defendant’s sweeping claim that former presidents are categorically immune from criminal prosecution ^{[1] [2]}.

2. Separation of powers as the controlling principle

The Court grounded its approach in separation-of-powers concerns: absolute immunity is justified only where criminal prosecution would unduly intrude on unique, constitutionally assigned presidential functions, while the need for “fair and effective” enforcement of federal criminal law counsels against a blanket rule that would place the President above the law ^[1]. This dual-reference — protect core executive authority, but preserve criminal accountability elsewhere — is repeated across majority explanations ^[1].

3. What the Court found — specific acts ruled immune or not

Applying its framework, the majority identified some categories of conduct as absolutely immune (for example, meetings with Justice Department officials about prosecutions and threats tied to the President’s removal power) and ruled that other charged conduct warranted further factual analysis or no immunity at all (such as alleged pressure on the Vice President, state officials, and certain private individuals), leaving those determinations to the lower courts ^{[6] [2]}.

4. How the Court balanced competing public interests

The opinion explicitly weighed the institutional need to let a President perform duties without fear of retaliatory prosecutions against the public interest in enforcing criminal law. That balancing led to the “presumptive immunity” category — the Court placed the burden on prosecutors to show that applying criminal law would not dangerously intrude on executive functions ^{[6] [1]}. The practical effect: prosecutors face a high evidentiary hurdle for many official-act allegations ^[6].

5. Dissenting and critical perspectives

Critics argue the majority’s framework expands executive power and risks creating de facto impunity for presidents who commit wrongdoing under the banner of “official acts.” Organizations such as the Brennan Center called the ruling an “affront to democracy,” saying it will complicate prosecutions and require dropping some allegations tied to commandeering the Department of Justice ^[7]. Opinion writers and some commentators likewise warn the decision could license weaponization of government power by insulating certain acts from criminal accountability ^{[8] [7]}.

6. Conservative commentators and scholars who defend the ruling

Other analysts — including some conservative legal scholars — defend the decision as consistent with precedent on official-immunity doctrines and necessary to preserve executive branch functioning, arguing the Court correctly protected core presidential powers like directing prosecutions or removal of executive officers from judicial second-guessing ^[6]. These defenders emphasize that the Court did not grant absolute immunity across the board and left many fact-specific questions to lower courts ^{[6] [1]}.

7. Practical consequences and open questions

The ruling directed prosecutors to drop or reframe certain allegations (notably those involving alleged commandeering of DOJ) and created a presumption that will make proving criminal liability for many “official” acts more difficult — effects already visible in subsequent litigation, including calls to revisit state convictions and removal-to-federal-court fights ^{[7] [9]}. However, the Court purposely left factual determinations to lower courts, so further appellate work will refine how the three-tier test applies in practice ^{[2] [1]}.

8. What reporting does not settle

Available sources do not mention a single, complete list of which specific indictment counts will ultimately survive or fall under immunity — the Court remanded many factual questions to lower courts, and subsequent outcomes depend on those record-specific proceedings ^{[1] [2]}. Sources also do not provide a definitive empirical measure yet of how frequently the “presumptive immunity” standard will block prosecutions across different factual contexts ^[6].

If you want, I can pull together the key excerpts from the Court’s slip opinion and the principal dissents so you can see the text the majority relied on and the counterarguments in their own words ^[1].