What are the legal and security risks for donors sending money or supplies to charities operating in Gaza in 2025?

1. The payment and platform squeeze: money can be trapped or reversed

Since 2024–25 major crowdfunding and payment services have intervened in Palestine-related fundraisers; GoFundMe and Stripe have at times blocked pages, frozen withdrawals, or suspended payment processing for Gaza-focused groups, forcing charities to seek bank deposits or other workarounds ^{[1] [2]}. Fundraisers report catastrophic drops in visible donations after such blocks and after ceasefires, meaning money raised may be refunded, delayed or held by intermediaries — a practical risk that can turn intended life‑saving transfers into inaccessible balances ^{[6] [7]}.

2. Fraud and cyber-risks: fake campaigns and phishing proliferate

Independent reporting and cybersecurity experts document sharp increases in fake accounts, fraudulent campaigns, and phishing tied to Gaza appeals in 2025; legitimate donors have had pages impersonated, and some frauds have raised thousands before removal and police investigation. Donors must verify organizers, platform histories and how funds are routed because scams are widespread even on reputable platforms ^{[8] [9]}.

3. Legal exposure: complicity, diversion and donor liability

Human-rights groups and legal organisations warned that privatized or politicized distribution systems — notably the U.S./Israeli‑backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) — create legal risks for operators and potentially for partners or funders tied to those systems. Campaigns or transfers that indirectly support entities accused of enabling rights abuses can raise questions about complicity in violations of international law, prompting complaints, investigations, or reputational and legal consequences ^{[5] [4] [10]}.

4. National counter‑terror and anti‑money‑laundering risks remain relevant

Available sources document concern that cash-assistance channels coordinated with Gaza institutions (for example MoSD) risk being linked “directly or indirectly” to proscribed groups, creating reputational and diversion risks noted even within donor-government documents. That reporting shows some governments treat diversion primarily as a reputational risk, but donors should be aware that national counter‑terror financing laws and donor-country policies can impose legal obligations or restrictions — especially when local intermediaries are affiliated with de facto authorities ^{[11] [12]}.

5. Operational security on the ground: aid is dangerous and often blocked

Deliveries and distributions have been repeatedly constrained by closed crossings, military control, and lethal incidents at distribution points; UN and NGOs report blocked access, long waits at borders, and hundreds or thousands of civilians harmed at militarized distribution sites linked to GHF operations. Donors sending in‑kind supplies or instructing couriers risk consignments being delayed, looted, destroyed or creating dangerous crowding that endangers recipients and volunteers ^{[3] [13] [4]}.

6. Reputational risk and humanitarian principle trade‑offs

Major humanitarian actors warn donors not to fund “militarized” or politicized aid schemes that violate neutrality, impartiality and independence; Amnesty, dozens of NGOs and UN experts say supporting such schemes risks complicity in harm. Donors who prioritize speed may inadvertently fund distribution systems the UN and human‑rights groups condemn — with serious reputational fallout ^{[14] [4] [15]}.

7. Practical risk‑mitigation: evidence‑based options cited by humanitarian actors

Humanitarian sources and advisers consistently recommend prioritising cash to trusted international or established NGOs (WFP, UNRWA, Save the Children, Oxfam, Islamic Relief, Anera) with verified transfer routes and financial controls, and checking charity ratings and platform histories; they also stress that cash is more flexible and cheaper than in‑kind aid ^{[16] [17] [9] [18] [3]}. The WFP and UN agencies report large prepositioned stocks and digital payment plans where access allows — but donors must confirm that the organization they choose can legally and practically deliver into Gaza ^{[17] [19]}.

8. Conflicting viewpoints and limits of reporting

Sources diverge: some outlets and US‑backed groups claim the GHF expanded access and delivered millions of meals, while UN agencies, legal groups and many NGOs say the GHF militarized distribution and exposed civilians to harm — UN experts called for its dismantling and legal organisations warned of liability ^{[20] [15] [4] [5]}. Available sources do not mention a single, uniformly safe private pipeline that eliminates legal and security risk for donors; any claim otherwise is not found in current reporting (not found in current reporting).

Conclusion: donors in 2025 must balance urgency with verification. Legal and security risk is not theoretical — platforms can block funds, delivery channels can be politicised or lethal, and legal complaints over complicity have been launched. The safest path shown in reporting is to give cash to vetted international agencies or well‑established NGOs with clear, documented delivery chains and to do due diligence on intermediaries and platform policies before donating ^{[16] [9] [3]}.