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What legal standard did the Supreme Court or lower courts establish for 'obedience to orders' in wartime after United States v. Calley?
Executive summary
The dominant legal standard described in post‑Calley military and legal commentary is that obedience is not a blanket defense: an order must be “manifestly” or “palpably” illegal — i.e., one that “a person of ordinary sense and understanding” would recognize as unlawful — for a service member to be required to refuse it [1] [2]. United States v. Calley reinforced that following orders does not excuse war crimes, but lower‑court and military rules frame the test as an objective one about obvious illegality rather than a broad subjective inquiry [3] [1].
1. The Calley ruling and the core holding: “Not a shield for war crimes”
United States v. Calley (the My Lai prosecutions) affirmed the principle that obedience to orders does not automatically absolve a soldier of responsibility for atrocities; the Nuremberg lineage means “obedience to orders is no longer a defense to war crimes,” a point emphasized by military historians and commentators summarizing Calley’s legacy [4] [3]. The Calley proceedings expressly stated that if an order directed the killing of unresisting civilians it would be illegal and compliance would not itself eliminate criminal responsibility [1].
2. The operative test after Calley: the “person of ordinary sense and understanding” standard
Military and appellate authorities following Calley articulated an objective standard: only orders that “a person of ordinary sense and understanding” would recognize as unlawful — sometimes phrased as “manifestly” or “palpably” illegal — justify refusal [1] [2]. Commentators and practice guides repeat that the narrow “manifest illegality” threshold governs, meaning routine lawful military duties retain a presumption of legality unless the unlawfulness is obvious [5] [2].
3. How courts and manuals operationalize the standard: Rule and precedent
The Manual for Courts‑Martial and later appellate decisions implement the objective approach by asking whether the order was unlawful on its face such that a reasonable servicemember would know it was illegal; CAAF and other authorities have rejected subjective or purely conscience‑based refusals where unlawfulness is not clear [6] [2]. Lower court opinions and military practice emphasize that only narrow, clearly criminal commands (for example, orders to murder civilians) meet the manifest‑illegality threshold described since Calley [6] [1].
4. Tension and critique: risk to “slower wit and quick obedience”
Contemporaneous criticism of the Calley standard warned it may be harsh to label as criminal those who are “not persons of ordinary sense and understanding,” exposing slow or strictly obedient troops to impossible choices under fire [3] [1]. The Calley opinion and later summaries acknowledge this tension: military effectiveness requires obedience, but the law imposes objective restraints to prevent barbaric acts even when given by commanders [3] [1].
5. Practical guidance and current discourse: “manifestly illegal” in modern contexts
Recent legal guides, advocates, and news reporting — often in the context of contemporary controversies — continue to describe the operative standard as whether an order violates the Constitution, the law of armed conflict, or clearly infringes rights such that obedience offers no protection; they repeatedly use terms like “manifestly illegal” or “unlawful on their face” [7] [8] [9]. Military legal FAQs and commentators apply Calley’s lesson to modern issues, noting that orders to commit atrocities clearly meet the test [9] [6].
6. Competing perspectives and limits of the record
Sources uniformly assert the objective, manifest‑illegality standard derived from Calley and earlier Nuremberg principles, but they differ on emphasis: some stress rigid enforcement to deter war crimes [4] [1], while critics and defense‑oriented commentators stress the hardship and potential injustice for ordinary soldiers forced to judge orders under battlefield pressure [3] [2]. Available sources do not mention any Supreme Court decision after Calley that supplants the Court of Military Appeals’ test; reporting and legal summaries instead point to military appellate rulings and manuals as the operative authorities [6] [2].
7. What to take away for officers and enlisted personnel
The practical rule carried forward from Calley is firm: do not assume “just following orders” will shield you if the command is manifestly criminal; conversely, refusing orders that are not obviously illegal risks discipline because courts apply an objective “ordinary person” test [1] [2]. Legal advisers, training, and the Manual for Courts‑Martial are the immediate sources of how the test is applied in real cases — the sources reviewed emphasize both the moral imperative to refuse atrocities and the legal peril of misjudging borderline commands [6] [9].
Limitations: this summary relies on the provided contemporary reporting and legal commentary; available sources do not mention any 2025 or later Supreme Court ruling that replaces the Calley/Court of Military Appeals standard [6] [2].