What legal standards and precedents do scholars cite for 'abuse of power,' 'tyranny,' and 'usurpation of appropriations power' as impeachable offenses?

1. Historical and textual roots: why abuse maps to “high crimes and misdemeanors”

The Framers rejected vague terms like “maladministration” but preserved a broad instrument—“high Crimes and Misdemeanors”—inherited from English impeachment practice precisely to police abuses of power that damage the state, as reflected in debates at the Convention and early state practice and reiterated in congressional histories and the Constitution Annotated ^{[3] [2] [4]}. Scholars therefore trace the standard to precedents such as the Strafford and Hastings proceedings in Britain and early American impeachments, which treated corruption, betrayal of the public trust, and gross misuse of office as paradigmatic impeachable conduct ^{[1] [2] [3]}.

2. “Abuse of power” as a doctrinal category: two accepted formulations

Leading accounts used by Congress and legal scholars split abuse of power into two related doctrinal strands: exercising official authority in a manner that on its face exceeds constitutional or legal limits, and using official power for improper personal or partisan ends that injure the national interest—both framed as abuses warranting impeachment even absent a statutory crime ^{[6] [5] [7]}. The Constitution Annotated, House Practice, and CRS analyses all emphasize that impeachment can target political offenses—“personal misconduct, gross neglect, usurpation, or habitual disregard of the public interests”—not solely indictable crimes ^{[3] [8] [4]}.

3. “Tyranny” and the Framers’ concern: substantive and structural harms

When scholars invoke “tyranny” as an impeachment concern they refer less to a single statutory offense than to conduct that transforms administration into oppression—subverting essential governmental principles or nullifying constitutional safeguards—which the Framers warned impeachment must check ^{[6] [3]}. Commentators from Joseph Story onward have described impeachment as appropriate for political offenses that “subvert the government” or involve habitual disregard of the public interest, language scholars cite when arguing that tyrannical conduct is impeachable even if non‑criminal ^{[3] [1]}.

4. Usurpation of appropriations power: precedent and doctrinal contours

Scholars point to the constitutional separation of powers—Congress’s spending authority and the President’s duty to respect legal limits—as the anchor for alleging usurpation of appropriations power; the congressional literature treats misuse or deliberate evasion of appropriations as an abuse that can be “high crimes and misdemeanors” when it reflects systematic disregard for constitutional constraints ^{[6] [9]}. Historical impeachments and committee reports—such as Nixon‑era articles alleging misuse of executive agencies and failed efforts to override congressional prerogatives—are cited as practical precedents showing that long‑standing institutional practice treats misapplication or usurpation of funds and powers as impeachable ^{[8] [7]}.

5. Limits, counterarguments, and the political nature of enforcement

A persistent alternative view—advanced by some Senators, legal commentators, and institutional literature—is that impeachment should generally track criminality or clear statutory violations and that broad political judgments risk converting removal into a partisan tool; the Senate’s acquittals and statements during modern trials reflect this tension and the lack of a judicially enforceable bright line ^{[10] [11] [4]}. Moreover, the Supreme Court has declared impeachment largely nonjusticiable, reinforcing that the contours of impeachable “abuse,” “tyranny,” or “usurpation” are defined through congressional practice and political judgment rather than settled judicial doctrine ^[4].

6. Bottom line: pragmatic standards scholars cite for prosecution in the House

In sum, legal scholarship and congressional practice converge on a pragmatic standard: impeachable offenses include gross abuses of official power, conduct that subverts constitutional processes or the public trust (what Framers feared as “tyranny”), and systematic usurpation of congressional prerogatives such as appropriations—whether or not those acts are indictable—while acknowledging countervailing views that urge restraint and criminal‑law anchors; ultimately, impeachment’s scope is shaped by history, practice, and political decisionmaking rather than a single judicially enforceable rule ^{[5] [2] [12]}.