How do local law enforcement and ICE coordinate identity checks and what information is shared?
Executive summary
Local law enforcement and ICE coordinate identity checks through formal deputization under Section 287(g) agreements and via automated biometrics and database linking that share fingerprints, photos, and biographic data in near real time [1] [2]. In practice this includes trained local officers performing immigration functions under ICE supervision, automated fingerprint/name checks that feed ICE databases, and wider data access arrangements (DMV, IRS, Medicaid) that can provide addresses, photos, and other identifiers [1] [2] [3] [4].
1. How the legal framework delegates authority: 287(g) deputization and scope
Federal law lets ICE formally delegate certain immigration functions to local officers under Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act; agencies that sign MOAs receive ICE training and are authorized to “perform specified immigration officer functions under the agency’s direction and supervision” [1]. ICE’s public materials describe 287(g) as a way to identify and remove “criminal aliens,” and the program includes several models (task-force, warrant service officer, etc.) with different authorities and placements of responsibility [1] [5].
2. What local officers actually do under these partnerships
When local agencies sign 287(g) agreements, trained officers can question arrestees for immigration status, complete ICE paperwork, serve administrative immigration warrants, and even execute enforcement steps that lead to transfer into ICE custody—actions that local officials and ICE tout as a “force multiplier” for removing removable aliens [1] [5]. Local reporting shows jurisdictions have used these agreements to screen arrestees and transfer hundreds of people to ICE custody in a single year [6] [7].
3. The biometric and records backbone: fingerprints, photos and integrated databases
Beyond deputized officers, coordination relies heavily on automated biometric and records-sharing systems. Local arrest fingerprints are routinely checked against FBI and DHS databases and those “hits” can trigger ICE identification and follow-up; federal systems like Secure Communities (and newer EID/EAGLE tools) are designed to share fingerprint-based identity confirmations with ICE in near real time [2] [8]. ICE’s Enforcement Integrated Database (EID) and related interfaces store and distribute personally identifiable information to support identification and enforcement [8].
4. Wider data sharing: DMV, IRS, Medicaid, and license-plate/location data
ICE does not rely solely on arrest processing. It has documented channels to access state DMV photos and data, and investigators and advocates report ICE using DMV photo searches and, in some cases, asking DMVs to run specific checks or revoke licenses [9] [10]. Courts and reporting also show an IRS–ICE memorandum allowing ICE to request taxpayer identity/address information under certain exceptions [3] [11] [12]. Reporting indicates ICE has sought and been granted access to location data and license-plate records from local agencies and private vendors—material used to locate targets [13].
5. What information is typically shared with local law enforcement
PII shared in coordination can include name, aliases, date of birth, addresses, country of citizenship, alien registration numbers (A-numbers), state IDs and fingerprint identifiers; ICE privacy documents state these biographic elements may accompany notifications or database matches [14]. ICE also runs biometric verification against DHS IDENT and other systems to confirm identity, and local agencies cannot always limit federal processing of fingerprints they submit for criminal checks [2] [14].
6. Informal communications, operational practices and risks
In addition to formal systems, “informal communications” matter: ICE agents may ask local personnel to run specific photo or plate checks, or to flag individuals, and ICE has at times used DMV and local police search capabilities for targeted operations [15] [10]. Rights advocates warn that such practices can lead to profiling, community mistrust, and people avoiding police; civil‑liberties groups document cases where information sharing expanded ICE’s reach and had chilling effects [16] [17].
7. Competing narratives and policy incentives
ICE and DHS frame partnerships and data sharing as tools to protect communities from dangerous offenders and to locate priority targets; they also offer reimbursements and incentives to expand cooperation [1] [18]. Critics—including the ACLU, NILC, and local advocates—counter that the expansion of 287(g) and cross-agency data sharing increases risks of civil‑rights abuses, racial profiling, and erosion of local control and community trust [17] [10] [7].
8. What sources do not say or leave unclear
Available sources document many channels (287(g), EID/Secure Communities, DMV/IRS/Medicaid arrangements), but they do not provide a single consolidated public ledger of every local–ICE data-sharing instance, nor do the documents fully enumerate exact technical queries ICE runs in each jurisdiction—those operational details are not found in current reporting (not found in current reporting). Likewise, precise safeguards used by every local agency vary and are only sporadically disclosed (not found in current reporting).
9. Practical takeaways for communities and individuals
If a local agency has signed a 287(g) MOA or participates in federal information-sharing programs, expect that arrest booking fingerprints and related biographic data can be shared with ICE, and that ICE can and does seek supplemental sources (DMV photos, IRS addresses, license-plate/location data) to locate individuals [1] [2] [3] [13]. Those concerned about privacy or community policing impacts should consult local MOAs and public PIAs and monitor proposals to expand or limit cooperation at the state and county level [8] [19].