Do other US cities with National Guard deployments show similar crime rate trends?
Executive summary
Available reporting shows that cities where the White House has deployed or threatened National Guard troops (including Washington, D.C.; Memphis; Los Angeles; Chicago; Baltimore; and others) were generally not the nation’s most violent cities and in many cases were already experiencing falling violent-crime trends before or during deployments [1] [2] [3]. Analyses by Stateline, AP and local outlets find homicides and other violent crimes declined in 2024–2025 in many of the places singled out for Guard action, though defenders of the deployments argue they helped suppress crime and restore order in targeted areas [1] [2] [4] [5].
1. “Not the worst of the worst”: deployments don’t match highest-crime cities
Multiple data-driven pieces conclude the Trump administration’s Guard deployments and proposals have not focused on the nation’s objectively most violent cities; Stateline’s analysis and related reporting show most target cities have lower violent-crime rates than many places left out of the effort [1] [6]. The Alaska Beacon/Alaska Public Media follow-up to Stateline specifically finds most of the deployment targets have lower violent-crime rates than Anchorage and other Alaska locales [6].
2. Crime was already falling in many targeted cities before troops arrived
AP and other outlets report that violent crime, including homicides, was on a downward trajectory in the first half of 2025 compared with 2024 in many of the named cities; AP notes homicides through mid‑2025 were substantially lower than the prior year [2] [7]. Local reporting in Washington shows the district’s violent-crime counts had been decreasing after a 2023 spike, complicating claims that the Guard alone produced those declines [8] [4].
3. Proponents credit Guard presence with “lowered crime”; critics point to broader trends
Conservative outlets and some GOP lawmakers and witnesses at Congressional hearings argue Guard deployments have reduced crime and helped “restore law and order” in places such as D.C., Los Angeles and Memphis [5]. By contrast, Stateline, AP and other reporters emphasize larger national and local downward trends in violent and property crime, suggesting the deployments do not map neatly onto cities with worsening crime and that declines were often underway before federal intervention [1] [2] [9].
4. Deterrence vs. long-term costs: expert caution on causal claims
Criminologists quoted in reporting warn that an influx of uniformed personnel can deter incidents in the short run, but questions remain about sustainability, constitutional authority, community impact and whether deployments follow evidence-based “hot-spot” strategies—reporters cite scholars urging data-driven targeting rather than blanket troop placements [10]. OPB notes experts worry Guard presence, especially when unrequested, could generate resentment and carry long-term costs even if short-term deterrence occurs [10].
5. Economic, legal and political side effects complicate the narrative
Journalists report side effects beyond crime metrics: tourism declines, court backlogs, and high daily spending associated with extended Guard and federal deployments in Washington, D.C., have been documented, complicating simple claims that deployments are cost-free fixes [4] [8]. Legal challenges and objections from city and state officials also figure prominently in coverage, underscoring that the moves are as political and constitutional as they are operational [11].
6. Cross-city comparisons show mixed patterns — data matters
Aggregated analyses (Stateline, AP, Vital City and others) find that the subset of cities targeted or threatened for Guard action had varied crime trajectories: most were experiencing declines in serious violent crimes in 2024–2025, though levels in some cities remained above the national average [1] [2] [3] [10]. Where reporting compares cities directly (for example, Anchorage vs. some target cities), it shows many deployed-to cities are actually safer by certain violent-crime metrics [6].
7. What reporting does not settle — and what to watch for next
Available sources do not mention robust causal studies proving Guard deployments produced the crime declines; most accounts emphasize correlation, timing and pre-existing trends rather than randomized evaluation of effects [1] [2] [10]. Future scrutiny should look for independent, disaggregated city-level time-series analyses and cost-benefit accounting, plus assessments of community policing outcomes and legal findings referenced in ongoing lawsuits [10] [11].
Conclusion: current reporting paints a contested picture — many of the cities targeted for Guard deployment were already seeing falling violent-crime rates, independent analyses show deployments were not concentrated in the highest-crime jurisdictions, and experts warn that short-term deterrence (if it exists) comes with political, fiscal and civil‑liberties tradeoffs that reporters and analysts say have not yet been fully measured [1] [2] [10] [4].