Which specific New York penal statutes correspond to the 34 counts in Trump's hush-money indictment?
Executive summary
The Manhattan indictment charged Donald Trump with 34 felony counts of falsifying business records in the first degree under New York Penal Law §175.10; each count corresponds to an alleged false business record tied to reimbursements for the $130,000 payment to Stormy Daniels and related entries dated between February and December 2017 (see indictment reporting) [1] [2]. Prosecutors framed the falsified records as intended to conceal other unlawful conduct — a theory that elevates the misdemeanor falsifying-business-records offense (NY Penal Law §175.05) into the §175.10 felony [3] [4].
1. The statutory label prosecutors used: 34 counts under NY Penal Law §175.10
Manhattan prosecutors charged 34 separate counts of falsifying business records in the first degree, explicitly invoking New York Penal Law §175.10 — the felony form of the falsifying-business-records statute — with each count tied to a different document or entry related to reimbursements to Michael Cohen and the hush‑money scheme [1] [2].
2. How the statutes fit together: misdemeanor baseline and felony enhancement
Under New York law, falsifying business records is a misdemeanor under §175.05 when done with intent to defraud; that basic offense becomes a felony under §175.10 when the falsification is done with intent to commit, aid, or conceal another crime. Prosecutors relied on that §175.10 pathway: they alleged the false entries were made to conceal unlawful activity, elevating each falsified document into a felony count [3] [4].
3. What the indictment’s 34 counts actually mapped to — documents and dates
Reporting indicates each of the 34 counts corresponds to a discrete business record entry dated from February 14 through December 5, 2017, that prosecutors say masked reimbursements tied to Cohen’s $130,000 payment to Stormy Daniels and ancillary expenses; the aggregate payments reported by some accounts total about $420,000 when related costs are included [1] [2].
4. The prosecution’s underlying theory: concealment of other crimes
The felony theory depends on proving the falsified entries were intended to conceal another unlawful act — prosecutors argued the reimbursements and their disguising as legal or consulting fees were meant to hide a payment designed to influence the 2016 election, thus satisfying the “intent to commit, aid or conceal” language of §175.10 as charged [5] [6]. That use of election-related harm as the “other crime” was central to the trial and later appellate briefing [5] [7].
5. Defense and academic pushback: statutory and evidentiary fault lines
Legal scholars and defense filings highlighted two recurring challenges: first, the felony enhancement presumes a prior misdemeanor act (§175.05), and the misdemeanor’s two‑year statute of limitations raises questions when prosecutors only charge the felony years later; second, critics say elevating ordinary campaign conduct to a felony risks stretching the statute beyond its intended bounds — points emphasized by Syracuse law commentary and other analysts [4] [3].
6. Trial outcome and subsequent litigation context (what sources report)
Media reporting and legal summaries in the provided set state a jury convicted Trump on the 34 counts in May 2024 and that sentencing occurred with an unconditional discharge in January 2025; those reports continue to show vigorous appeals and government filings arguing over whether evidence about official acts was improperly admitted and whether federal law or presidential immunity affected the case [5] [8] [7] [9].
7. What sources do not say or explicitly resolve
Available sources do not list each of the 34 indictment counts by document caption or quote the indictment’s exact language count‑by‑count; they do not provide the original indictment text in full in these search results, so mapping each count to a specific line‑item description beyond the general date range and reimbursement framing is not in current reporting (not found in current reporting).
8. Why the statutory specifics matter politically and legally
The choice to charge §175.10 — rather than only misdemeanors — framed the case as more than bookkeeping errors: it made the prosecution rest on the claim that bookkeeping masked criminal conduct with public‑policy implications (election influence), which in turn triggered constitutional and federal‑preemption fights now unfolding in appeals and DOJ submissions [6] [7]. Critics argue that prosecutorial theory broadens criminal exposure for ordinary campaign decisions; supporters say the statute properly captures concealment schemes that hide unlawful ends [4] [6].
If you want, I can pull the publicly filed indictment language (count headings and dates) and list each of the 34 document entries side‑by‑side with the statute citation — but those primary‑document filings are not included among your provided sources and would need to be located and cited.