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What has been the Nigerian government and military response to attacks on Christians since 2015, and how effective has it been?
Executive summary
Since 2015 the Nigerian state has combined military campaigns against jihadist groups, law-and-order responses to banditry, and denials that Christians are uniquely targeted — while critics say security forces have been slow, inconsistent, or complicit; independent monitors show large numbers of civilians of all faiths killed, and specific datasets identify hundreds of incidents targeting Christians (e.g., 384 incidents with 317 deaths from 2020–Sep 2025) [1] [2]. Evaluations of effectiveness diverge: government and some analysts point to active military operations and willingness to accept international help [3] [4], while human-rights groups, church bodies and some parliamentary submissions describe inadequate response, delayed deployments or possible complicity that foster impunity [5] [6].
1. Military offensives and counter‑terror campaigns: persistence, not eradication
The Nigerian military has led sustained counter‑insurgency operations against Boko Haram/ISWAP and against bandits, and remains “the largest in sub‑Saharan Africa” actively engaged in fighting armed groups — but these operations have not stopped attacks on communities, including church attacks and mass kidnappings [4] [7]. Observers note that despite declarations (for example earlier claims Boko Haram had been defeated), splinter groups and ISWAP retained capacity to strike, abduct and murder after 2015 [5] [8].
2. Denials and diplomatic pushback from Abuja
The Nigerian government has publicly rejected the narrative that Christians are being uniquely persecuted, calling such claims “a gross misrepresentation of reality” and stressing that terrorists attack Muslims and Christians alike [9] [10]. At the same time, Abuja has signalled willingness to accept foreign assistance if sovereignty is respected — a tightrope that came into focus after U.S. threats of action in 2025 [3].
3. Criticism from church bodies, rights NGOs and some foreign parliaments
Christian leaders and NGOs say attacks rose sharply from 2015 and accuse the state and security forces of negligence or complicity, especially in central “Middle Belt” farming areas; submissions to foreign parliaments argue the Nigerian Security Forces’ delayed responses and failure to seize weapons foster impunity [6] [5]. International religious‑freedom actors and some legislators have pushed for sanctions, redesignation as a “country of particular concern,” and other political levers to compel action [11] [12].
4. Conflicting data and contested narratives about scale and motive
Independent datasets and analyses complicate a simple “targeted Christians” narrative: ACLED and analysts cited by Reuters/ BBC/ others find that while Christians are among victims, many victims of political violence are Muslims and attacks can be motivated by land, ethnic conflict, criminality or jihadism rather than strictly by religious identity [4] [2] [1]. At the same time, specialised Christian organisations and some researchers report very high tolls for Christians, producing starkly different estimates that heighten political pressure [13] [14].
5. Effectiveness: patchy security gains, local variation, and continuing impunity claims
Where the military is deployed and partnered with local actors outcomes can be measured in disrupted group operations; yet critics point to a pattern where security forces arrive late or are accused of failing to protect vulnerable farming communities, leaving displaced populations and low trust in state protection [5] [4]. High‑profile mass kidnappings and church attacks in 2025 underscore continued vulnerabilities and fuel arguments that government response has been inadequate [7] [4].
6. International pressure and its limits
U.S. political moves in 2025 — including redesignation as a “country of particular concern” and public threats of military planning — have elevated the issue internationally but also provoked strong rebuttals from Abuja and warnings about sovereignty; policymakers debate whether sanctions, aid leverage, or military engagement would reduce violence or further harm civilians [2] [3] [10]. Reporting stresses that cutting humanitarian aid can have fatal consequences for civilians, complicating policy choices [15].
7. What the sources do not resolve
Available sources do not present a single, authoritative casualty figure specifically for Christians that is agreed across independent monitors, church groups and government records; they also do not establish routine, verifiable proof of systematic state complicity in all cases — though allegations and parliamentary submissions assert negligence or worse in some regions [1] [5].
Conclusion — a contested record with real human cost: Government forces have been active against jihadist groups and have signalled willingness to accept help, but persistent attacks, disputed casualty counts, notable high‑profile failures to protect civilians, and strong criticisms from church bodies and rights groups together mean assessments of effectiveness remain sharply divided in the reporting [4] [5] [1].