What were the most notable right wing terror attacks in late 2024 and all if 2025
Executive summary
In late 2024 the most-noted international incidents tied to the extreme right included the mid‑June racist stabbings in Oulu, Finland, and multiple country‑level spikes documented by specialist trackers; Observatorio recorded eight right‑wing‑linked incidents in December 2024 and several months with higher counts earlier in the year (June–August) [1] [2]. In 2025 reporting and datasets show a shift in the U.S. from a historical dominance of right‑wing fatal attacks toward an unusual lull in right‑wing incidents in the first half of 2025 and a simultaneous rise in left‑wing incidents in some datasets — CSIS found only one coded right‑wing attack to July 4, 2025 (the June assassination of a Minnesota legislator), while left‑wing attacks outnumbered right‑wing ones for the first time in 30 years through mid‑2025 [1] [3] [4].
1. Global picture in late 2024: hotspots and notable episodes
Specialized trackers and encyclopedic summaries show that late 2024 continued to feature a geographically dispersed pattern of extreme‑right violence: public monitoring groups recorded concentrated activity in June–August and flagged incidents such as the racist stabbings in Oulu in mid‑June 2024, and Observatorio reported eight right‑wing‑linked incidents in December 2024 across six countries [1] [2]. These reports emphasize both direct violence and an uptick in prosecutions, trials and foiled plots as part of the trend; summaries underline that right‑wing actors — including groups like the Nordic Resistance Movement — remain active transnationally [1] [5].
2. The U.S. pattern through 2025: a notable decline in right‑wing incidents in early 2025
U.S.-focused analysis diverges from longer historical patterns: CSIS and media summaries conclude that through July 4, 2025 there was a sharp drop in incidents coded as right‑wing attacks — only one in that period, the June assassination of Minnesota state representative Melissa Hortman and her husband — while several left‑wing incidents were recorded, producing an unusual crossover in counts [3] [4]. Independent commentators and fact‑checkers noted the same pattern, stressing that the sample is through early July and that lethality and historical context still favor the right when measured over longer spans [3] [6].
3. How different datasets and definitions change the headline
Researchers warn that counting “attacks and plots” depends on definitions and coding choices. Long‑running reviews (CSIS, ADL, University of Maryland datasets) show that over decades right‑wing perpetrators historically accounted for the majority of domestic‑terror fatalities in the U.S.; other studies and government reports removed or revised findings have fed political controversy about which side is more dangerous now [7] [8] [9]. Observatorio’s monthly counts focus on incidents worldwide and show sustained right‑wing activity in 2025 (e.g., multiple months with 14+ incidents), highlighting that global trends can differ from U.S. mid‑year snapshots [10] [11].
4. Key cases and symbolic attacks to watch
Sources single out a few emblematic events: the Oulu stabbings in Finland (mid‑June 2024) connected to Nordic Resistance Movement sympathies, multiple high‑profile U.S. mass‑attacks in prior years cited by ADL as accelerationist‑inspired, and the June 2025 Minnesota assassination that CSIS coded as the lone right‑wing incident through July 4 [1] [7] [3]. Observatorio’s rolling monthly reports list recurring arrests, plots and rhetorical violence that together shape threat assessments even when lethal attacks are infrequent [2] [12].
5. Competing interpretations and political use of the data
Analysts and political actors draw opposing conclusions: some argue the mid‑2025 decline in right‑wing incidents proves a shift in the problem’s center (CSIS; media coverage), while others point to long‑term data showing right‑wing extremism historically caused more deaths and caution that short‑term shifts can be temporary or reflect enforcement and coding differences [3] [7] [6]. Government messaging has also been partisan: the White House and other actors framed recent violence through particular lenses in 2025, and the DOJ’s handling of certain studies became a political flashpoint [13] [9].
6. What reporting doesn’t say — key limitations you should note
Available sources do not offer a single, agreed‑upon, exhaustive list of “most notable” right‑wing terror attacks worldwide for late 2024 and all of 2025; trends depend on definition, geography and which database is used [8] [14]. Many trackers emphasize incidents, foiled plots, and rhetorical violence separately; fatality counts and lethality differ by time window. Major datasets cited here end at mid‑2025 or later in 2025 and some government reports were removed or revised, which affects comparability over time [3] [9].
Conclusion: multiple datasets show persistent right‑wing threat globally in late 2024, while U.S. data through mid‑2025 recorded an exceptional dip in coded right‑wing incidents and a small rise in left‑wing attacks; interpretation depends on timeframe, geographic focus and methodology, so both long‑term dominance of right‑wing lethality (historical datasets) and a short‑term early‑2025 decline in right‑wing incidents (CSIS) are accurate within their cited sources [7] [3].