What oversight or independent audits exist that verify DHS/HHS claims about children located since 2019?
Executive summary
Since 2019, independent oversight of claims about the whereabouts and status of unaccompanied migrant children has been carried out primarily by two inspector general offices—DHS OIG and HHS OIG—which have produced audits, evaluations, and reports documenting major data, technology, and process gaps that limit definitive verification of many public claims [1] [2] [3]. Those reports confirm active oversight but also show systemic limitations in tracking children once they leave federal custody, leaving large swaths of public assertions empirically unverifiable with existing public audits [4] [5].
1. What audits actually exist: inspector generals on duty
Both the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General and the Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Inspector General maintain ongoing audit programs that have produced multiple reports about unaccompanied alien children (UACs), including audits of transfers, custody, and sponsor vetting, and specific status reports covering FY2019–FY2023; DHS OIG has assembled audits and evaluations on UACs [1] [6] [4] while HHS OIG explicitly lists audits, evaluations, and investigations into the Office of Refugee Resettlement’s handling of UACs, grantee expenditures, and safety standards [2] [7].
2. What those audits find: data and technology shortfalls
Inspector general reports repeatedly document that neither agency had a fully integrated data system to track children across agency handoffs, and DHS audits found DHS lacked the technology to account for separated children reliably—findings that directly undermine the capacity to verify counts or locations after release to sponsors [5] [3]. The DHS OIG and HHS OIG reports note MOAs and incremental system upgrades, but emphasize that improvements made in 2018–2021 were insufficient to retroactively reconcile custody and appearance records between agencies for large cohorts of children [5] [4].
3. Limits of oversight: where audits cannot follow
Inspector general audits can and do verify agency processes, transfers, and internal recordkeeping while children are in federal custody, but once ORR releases a child to a sponsor the federal custodial relationship ends and audits repeatedly flag the practical limits of federal monitoring—ORR’s safety-and-wellbeing calls and sponsor checks are audited activities, yet HHS OIG and DHS OIG reports concede incomplete reach and record reconciliation for post-release whereabouts [2] [3] [4]. This gap is why large public claims about “missing” or “lost” children—such as contested figures cited in political and media narratives—cannot be fully validated or refuted solely by existing inspector general reports [8] FOIA-Request-Lost-Migrant-Children" target="blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">[9].
**4. Independent verification beyond inspector generals: FOIA, Congress, and reporting**
Outside the inspector generals, Congress has held hearings and committees have used OIG reports to press agencies on counts and procedures, and outside groups have sought data through FOIA, sometimes confronting refusals and litigation that illustrate incomplete public transparency [10] [11] [9]. News organizations and investigative outlets have leaned on OIG findings—such as DHS OIG’s tabulations of Notices to Appear and court no-shows—to analyze trends, but those analyses rely on the same imperfect administrative records the OIGs critique [8] [4].
5. Bottom line and what remains to be audited
Formal, recurring oversight exists and is substantive—DHS OIG and HHS OIG audits document how many children entered and left federal custody, identify procedural failures, and recommend corrective steps [1] [2] [3]. However, those same oversight products make clear they cannot independently verify comprehensive, up-to-the-minute location data for children after release to sponsors because of broken or non-integrated data systems and statutory custodial limits; therefore, many headline claims about precise numbers “lost” or “missing” since 2019 exceed what the existing independent audits can conclusively confirm or deny [5] [4] [3]. Additional independent auditing or statutory changes to enable cross‑agency, longitudinal tracking would be required to convert process audits into definitive verification of post‑release whereabouts—something current OIG work documents as a remaining shortfall [2] [4].