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Which counts, if any, are based on alleged payments to conceal information versus alleged document falsifications?
Executive summary
Available sources distinguish two related but legally distinct conduct categories: payments to conceal information—often charged as concealment, false certification, or retention of ill-gotten funds—and document falsification—charged under statutes criminalizing creation, alteration, or false entries in records (e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001, 18 U.S.C. § 1519, 8 U.S.C. § 1324c) [1] [2] [3]. Statutes and commentary treat concealment-for-fee and falsified entries both as criminal if done knowingly and with intent to deceive; some statutes explicitly criminalize both concealing material facts and falsifying records [2] [3] [4].
1. Two legal cores: concealment-for-pay vs. falsified documents
Federal law and legal commentary treat “payments to conceal information” and “document falsifications” as separate modes of wrongdoing that can overlap in a single prosecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1324c, for example, targets persons who for a fee prepare or assist in preparing an application that was “falsely made” and who fail to disclose or who conceal that fact—so the statute addresses both the paid-concealment business model and the falsity of the underlying document [3] [5]. By contrast, statutes like 18 U.S.C. § 1519 criminalize altering, destroying, or falsifying records with intent to impede an investigation—a classic document-falsification statute aimed at the act of making records false or hiding them [2].
2. What counts as “payments to conceal” in the sources
Sources show “payments to conceal” appear in contexts where someone is paid to prepare or hide false applications or to retain overpayments by failing to disclose them. The Cornell/LII text of 8 U.S.C. § 1324c explicitly criminalizes preparing or assisting in preparing a falsely made immigration application “for a fee or other remuneration” and concealing that fact [3]. The Gibson Dunn False Claims Act summary describes settlements where defendants “improperly failed to disclose” subcontractor use or “retained inflated payments,” characterizing concealment or non-disclosure of material facts that preserve a financial benefit [6].
3. What counts as “document falsification” in the sources
Document falsification is defined broadly in the materials: creating false entries, altering signatures, fabricating financial records, or otherwise making documents misleading. FederalCharges and other legal explainers cite 18 U.S.C. § 1001’s ban on knowingly and willfully falsifying, concealing, or covering up material facts, and Leppard Law highlights that falsification (forgery, altering, fabricating) is criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 [7] [1]. The Federal Register’s “falsification regulations” language groups alterations, reproductions, omissions, and concealing by omission under falsification prohibitions [4].
4. Where the categories overlap — prosecutions commonly charge both
The sources show overlap: a scheme where someone is paid to submit a false application both involves a payment-to-conceal theory (fee for concealment/preparation) and an underlying falsified document theory (the application is false). 8 U.S.C. § 1324c’s language links the fee-for-service element with the falsity of the application [3]. Similarly, False Claims Act cases referenced by Gibson Dunn involved both alleged false certifications and falsified invoices—so prosecutors can and do allege both concealment/retention of payments and document falsification in the same matter [6].
5. Statutory severity and intent elements — why the distinction matters
Different statutes impose different penalties and require different proof. 18 U.S.C. § 1519 criminalizes falsification when intended to impede an investigation and carries up to 20 years [2]. 8 U.S.C. § 1324c targets fee-based preparation and concealment in immigration contexts with penalties up to 5 years [3] [5]. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 covers false statements or falsifying or concealing material facts across federal matters [1]. The required mens rea—knowing/willful misconduct—appears across these sources, making intent central to both concealment-for-pay and falsification charges [1] [2] [3].
6. Practical examples and prosecutorial strategy in the reporting
The ACFE and Gibson Dunn summaries show practical patterns: executives or vendors may direct falsified entries to conceal embezzlement (Tyco example) or submit falsified invoices and certifications to collect government funds [8] [6]. Prosecutors frequently pair document-falsification counts (making false entries, forging invoices) with concealment or false certification allegations to address both the act of falsifying and the financial motive or benefit [8] [6].
7. Limitations of available reporting
Available sources outline statutes and corporate/agency examples but do not provide a single, exhaustive taxonomy mapping every specific criminal count in any one indictment to “payment-to-conceal” versus “document falsification.” For particular charges in a named case, available sources do not mention that case’s full charging instrument here; consult the indictment or charging document itself for precise count-by-count classification (not found in current reporting).
Summary: statutes and practice in the provided sources show both distinct and overlapping theories—some counts focus on being paid to conceal or failing to disclose a false application, while others focus on the physical or electronic falsification of records; prosecutors commonly charge both where facts support each theory [3] [2] [1] [6].