How does the Periodic Review Board (PRB) process work and who has been cleared from Guantánamo since 2010?
Executive summary
The Periodic Review Board (PRB) is an interagency, administrative mechanism created under President Obama to determine whether certain Guantánamo detainees held without charge can be safely transferred, released, or should remain detained; Congress later codified the process and successive administrations have continued it [1] [2]. Since the PRB began reviewing cases in 2013–2014, the boards have issued decisions on dozens of detainees—Human Rights First reports 64 decisions with 38 detainees cleared for transfer by PRBs (36 of whom were ultimately transferred) while 26 were recommended for continued detention—though critics argue the process has been inconsistent, politicized, and reliant on flawed intelligence [2] [3] [4].
1. How the PRB was created and what it is supposed to do
Executive Order 13567 (March 2011) established the PRB to provide periodic administrative review of detainees designated for potential indefinite detention under the AUMF; the order framed the PRB as an administrative check—distinct from criminal prosecutions or habeas litigation—intended to evaluate whether continued military detention is justified by national security and foreign policy interests [1]. The Obama administration operationalized the boards after a 2009 Guantánamo Review Task Force assessed detainees’ dispositions, and Congress later codified the PRB framework in the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act, giving the process statutory footing even as later presidents kept or adjusted it [5] [2].
2. How a PRB actually works in practice
A PRB assembles an interagency panel that reviews classified and unclassified evidence, considers submissions from the detainee and counsel, and hears testimony from government representatives; the boards aim for consensus but ultimately recommend either transfer/clearance or continued law-of-war detention, with decisions reflecting input from intelligence, defense and diplomatic principals [2] [6]. The PRB is administrative, so its recommendations do not equate to criminal exoneration; transfers require diplomatic arrangements and receiving-country guarantees, meaning clearance does not always mean immediate release [1] [2].
3. What the PRBs have recommended and the hard numbers
Human Rights First counts 64 detainee decisions by PRBs, with 38 cleared for transfer and 26 recommended for continued detention; thirty-six of the 38 cleared detainees were subsequently transferred to home or third countries, underscoring that PRB clearance has in most instances led to release though sometimes delayed by diplomacy and safety concerns [2]. Other analyses note similar tallies: under Obama-era PRB activity, dozens were reviewed and many recommended for transfer—Lawfare documents that before Trump’s inauguration the PRB conducted 72 initial reviews approving 31 detainees for release and eight full reviews approving seven more, while after 2017 the board’s pattern shifted toward recommending continued detention [3].
4. Examples and timelines of notable clearances
Individual examples illustrate the gap between clearance and transfer: Mohammed Kamin was cleared by a PRB in October 2015 and transferred to the United Arab Emirates in August 2016 after resettlement negotiations [7]. Ravil Mingazov was reviewed and approved for release in July 2016 and transferred to the UAE in January 2017 amid diplomatic complications [8]. Haroon al‑Afghani’s most recent review led to approval for release in October 2021, and reporting notes he became the first prisoner since 2010 to have his habeas petition granted by a U.S. court around that time—showing how PRB outcomes can coincide with, but are separate from, judicial rulings [8].
5. Criticisms, political dynamics and limits of the record
Critics and rights groups say the PRB’s reliance on long-circulated and sometimes distorted intelligence—visible when boards re-examine “worst of the worst” labels—and the political backdrop (Congressional and presidential hostility to transfers) have made the process uneven and at times a paper exercise that delays meaningful remedy [4] [3]. Advocates note that many detainees the interagency Task Force cleared for transfer in 2010 remained in detention until PRBs or diplomatic resettlement occurred, underscoring that administrative clearance, judicial habeas outcomes, and political will are distinct levers that determine a detainee’s fate [5] [9]. The publicly available sources provide consolidated counts and notable case examples, but do not contain a fully up‑to‑date, individual-by-individual roster in a single official list accessible here, so precise current tallies and names beyond the cited examples require consulting the PRS or advocacy trackers for live updates [6] [8].