Which police departments entered DOJ consent decrees after 2014 and what measurable changes followed?
Executive summary
Federal consent decrees have been imposed on or negotiated with multiple U.S. police agencies in the post‑2014 era — prominent examples include Albuquerque (consent decree filed November 2014), Newark (entered 2016), and cities whose reform processes trace to 2014 investigations such as Cleveland and Baltimore — and the measurable effects reported vary widely, from documented policy and training changes to mixed or adverse outcome metrics that resist simple causal claims [1] [2] [3] [4]. The Justice Department and monitors typically measure “success” as compliance with decree terms — a technical, documentable standard — while independent outcome measures (force incidents, shootings, community trust, stop rates) show inconsistent patterns across jurisdictions [1] [5] [6].
1. Which departments entered decrees or agreements after 2014: a short list and context
Among the better‑documented post‑2014 DOJ actions are the Albuquerque Police Department (consent decree filed November 2014) and the Newark Police Department (consent decree entered in 2016 following DOJ and U.S. Attorney reports from 2014) while Cleveland’s 2014 investigation led to a settlement process and a court‑supervised agreement; other long‑running or related interventions include Baltimore, Ferguson and Minneapolis reforms that were catalyzed by high‑profile 2014–2015 cases and subsequent DOJ activity [1] [2] [3] [4].
2. What the decrees demanded: policy, training, oversight — and how compliance is judged
Consent decrees are court‑enforceable settlement agreements that require concrete changes in policy, training, supervision, data systems and independent monitoring; compliance is reported by monitors to the court and is the DOJ’s primary measure of implementation — not necessarily a direct measure of community outcomes — meaning “success” often means the department has implemented required policies, training programs, and oversight mechanisms to the monitor’s satisfaction [6] [5] [1].
3. Measurable changes — policy adoption and administrative outputs
Across departments under decree, monitors and cities report concrete administrative reforms: new use‑of‑force and crisis‑intervention policies, revamped misconduct investigations, mandated training, data collection upgrades and the appointment of independent monitors — Cleveland, for example, developed a Crisis Intervention Advisory Committee and revised force policies after the 2014 DOJ findings [3]. Albuquerque produced thousands of pages of oversight reports and was found by its monitor to have largely implemented mandated reforms prior to termination motions [1].
4. Measurable changes — operational and outcome metrics: mixed results
Outcome metrics after decrees show a mixed record. Albuquerque, despite reaching compliance milestones and a joint motion to end oversight, experienced a 44% increase in police killings during the period covered by monitoring reports, underscoring that compliance with decree terms does not automatically translate into reduced lethal force [1]. Ferguson reported longer‑term shifts such as a more racially diverse force and fewer traffic stops as measurable post‑reform trends, but these changes took years to appear and cannot be unambiguously attributed solely to the decree process [7]. Newark’s DOJ report documented pervasive unconstitutional stops pre‑decree (75% of pedestrian stops lacked legal basis in 2009–2012), and the subsequent consent‑decree era focused on correcting those investigative and supervisory failures though independent outcome data are unevenly reported [2].
5. Why measuring impact is hard — incentives, measurement frameworks and political winds
Measurement is complicated because the DOJ, monitors and courts measure compliance with specific remedial tasks while cities and communities care about broader outcomes like fewer shootings, fairer stops and restored trust; researchers and watchdogs note that decrees can be “box‑checking” exercises even when paperwork, training and policy changes are accomplished, and political shifts (e.g., decisions to pause or unwind investigations) also reshape how long reform efforts persist [1] [5] [8]. Independent assessments, when available, show progress on processes but highly variable impacts on violence, complaints and racial disparities [9] [4].
6. Bottom line: decrees change structures reliably; outcomes vary and attribution remains contested
DOJ consent decrees routinely produce measurable structural reforms — new policies, training programs, monitoring reports and documented compliance milestones — but the evidence that those structural changes reliably produce desired outcomes such as fewer police killings, sustained reductions in discriminatory stops, or restored community trust is mixed across jurisdictions and often contested; public reporting and DOJ monitoring tend to emphasize compliance while independent outcome metrics sometimes tell a different story, and the available sources do not permit definitive causal claims across the board [5] [1] [7].