What legal authority does the president have to withhold federal funds from sanctuary cities?
Executive summary
The president can direct executive agencies to identify and try to withhold federal funds from jurisdictions labeled “sanctuary,” and administrations have used executive orders and agency directives to that effect [1] [2]. However, federal courts have repeatedly ruled that the executive branch lacks constitutional authority to unilaterally strip or condition federal grants without clear congressional authorization, citing the Spending Clause, separation-of-powers limits, and anti-commandeering principles [3] [4] [5].
1. Presidential tools on paper: orders, lists and agency directives
Presidents rely on executive orders and agency instructions to combat sanctuary policies, instructing the Attorney General and DHS to publish lists of noncompliant jurisdictions, to review grants that “abet” sanctuary policies, and to notify jurisdictions that they may lose federal funding if they do not comply [1] [6]. The current administration has issued such orders and directed agencies to identify funds that could be withheld and to publish so-called sanctuary lists, and the DOJ has likewise compiled lists and sued jurisdictions it views as obstructing federal immigration enforcement [1] [7].
2. The constitutional limit: Congress controls the purse
Federal courts have consistently grounded limits on presidential withholding of funds in the Constitution’s Spending Clause and the separation of powers, holding that the Executive may not refuse to disperse federal grants without congressional authorization [3] [8]. The Ninth Circuit explicitly found that an executive order directing agencies to withhold congressionally appropriated funds in order to punish sanctuary jurisdictions exceeded presidential authority, because Congress—not the President—sets the conditions on federal grants [4] [3].
3. Anti‑commandeering and coercion: why courts block agency pressure
Judges have also invoked anti‑commandeering principles and the coercion doctrine, finding that efforts to coerce state and local governments into enforcing federal immigration law by threatening to cut off funding are unconstitutional [9] [10]. Courts issuing injunctions have described the threat to withhold funds as causing irreparable harm and as an unlawful attempt to make local officials do ICE’s work, leading to preliminary injunctions halting enforcement of executive directives [11] [12] [9].
4. Litigation is the frontline — and the results are mixed but instructive
The Trump administration’s earlier attempts to deny grants were blocked in district courts and affirmed in key respects by appellate panels, producing nationwide litigation that curtailed executive efforts to impose funding conditions without statutory backing [4] [5] [10]. Recent litigation continues: courts in 2025 issued injunctions preventing the administration from withholding funds from dozens of jurisdictions while suits proceed, underscoring that unilateral executive effort faces steep judicial review [11] [13].
5. Political routes: Congress or new statutes change the calculus
If Congress enacts statutes that clearly condition specific federal funds on cooperation with federal immigration enforcement, the executive could lawfully withhold funds in line with those statutory conditions; proponents are pushing bills such as H.R. 32 to give presidents broader power to cut grants to sanctuary jurisdictions [2]. Absent such congressional authorization, legal experts and civil‑liberties groups argue the executive posture is likely to fail in court and warns that threats to prosecute local officials or strip funds are both constitutionally suspect and practically limited [14] [2].
6. Competing narratives and the practical takeaway
The administration frames funding threats as necessary to protect communities and enforce federal immigration law, arguing statutory violations and national security concerns justify aggressive action [1] [6], while opponents and multiple courts respond that the Constitution and precedent restrain the president from using the spending power as a blunt instrument against state and local policies [3] [10]. Practically, the president can direct agencies and initiate litigation and lists, but sustained, lawful nationwide defunding of sanctuary jurisdictions requires either clear congressional authorization or a change in how courts interpret executive spending powers — neither of which the courts have given the executive to date [3] [4] [13].